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ABSTRACT
Pricing and Local-Content Decisions of a Multinational Firm in a Duopoly Market
by
LIU Nanqin
Master of Philosophy

The internationalization of production requires each multinational firm to determine the
local content rate for his product that is made and sold in a foreign country. In this
thesis, we investigate the local content rate and pricing decisions for a multinational
firm who competes with a local firm in a market without and with a local content
requirement (LCR). We develop and solve a two-stage decision problem in which the
multinational firm determines his optimal local content rate and the two firms then make
their pricing decisions. Our analytical results show that the multinational firm sets a
lower local content rate, when the competition between the product of the multinational
firm and that of the local firm intensifies, consumers' valuation is more strongly affected
by the quality of the product of the multinational firm, and the reduction in consumers'
marginal utility is smaller. We also show that an LCR may induce the multinational
firm to increase local content rate and transfer benefits from the multinational firm to
the local firm. However, a very high LCR threshold will cause the multinational firm
to adopt a low local content rate, resulting in a low demand and profit for both the
multinational firm and the local firm.
Key words: Local content rate; local content requirement; quality; competition; duopoly
market.
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1

Introduction

With the rapid globalization and development of the world economy, nowadays there
are a large number of multinational firms making direct investment in foreign countries.
A vital decision for each multinational firm is to determine the local content rate for
its product that are made and sold in a foreign country. Actually, most multinational
firms in practice have paid increasing attention to the decision problem for the local
content rate. In March 2012, Volkswagen (India) [30] released its plan for increasing
its local content rate from 75% to 90%, in order to reduce its operating cost. In 2012,
Toyota Kirloskar Motor (India) [19] planed to increase its local content rate for the Etios
brand from 70% to 90%, and other components are imported from Japan. In December
2011, Guangzhou Fiat (China) [6] announced that the firm would raise the local content
rate for C-medium automobiles to 90%, in order to greatly reduce production costs and
succeed in mass production.
The local-content decision is important mainly because the acquisition cost of an
imported component usually differs from that of a locally purchased one, and such a
decision significantly influences the multinational firm's profit. A multinational firm has
to pay the purchasing cost, the transportation cost, and the tariff for an imported component, whereas the firm mainly pays purchasing cost for a local component. Note that
although the acquisition cost of an imported component includes an additional transportation cost and a tariff, it may be larger than or may be smaller than the acquisition
cost of a local component. This largely depends on the difference between the technological contents in the imported and the local components. In a developing country,
local components at a high technological level might be expensive due to the inferior
technological capability of local components producers; however, local components at a
low technological level could be very cheap. According to Veloso [33], in an OEM car
assembly plant located in a developing region, most components-such as powertrain
and chassis-sourced from a foreign market (e.g., the France-Benelux Scenario) with
a high production volume are cheaper than the components that are locally produced,
while the body subsystem is the only locally sourced component that is cheaper than
an imported one. Veloso ascribed the result to the fact that the production of different
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subsystems relies on different proportions of manufacturing efficiency, labor, and capital.
Thus, for some components, the reduction in the wage and that in the transportation
cost are not enough to offset the increase in the unit production cost.
In addition to the cost, the quality is also important to the local-content decision.
The technology owned by a developing country is usually less advanced than that owned
by a developed country. For a specific industry, among developed countries there are
also differences in the level of sophistication. Multinational firms originating in countries
with advanced and mature technology in a specific industry often make foreign direct investment in countries that are less sophisticated in the industry. For example, a number
of giant multinational firms with advanced and mature technologies-e.g. BMW (Germany), Volvo (Switzerland), GM (U.S.), Toyota (Japan), and Nissan (Japan)-have
made FDis in China. Chinese automakers, however, seldom invest in these developed
countries. They made FDis in other countries that are less sophisticated in auto industry. For instance, Chery invests in Egypt, Iran, Russia, Malaysia, Uruguay, Thailand,
Vietnam, Ukraine and Brazil.
Thus, in line with the practice, we mainly consider the situation that a multinational
firm's parent country possesses more advanced technology than the host country does.
And thus components imported by a multinational firm often contain a higher technology
and can be thus used to make products of a higher quality. A multinational firm usually
sets specific positioning for its product. Because local technology may not satisfy the
firm's requirement and the firm does not intend to reveal cutting-edge technology to
the host country, the firm should import some key components. Actually, multinational
firms' local content rates seldom reach 100%, a phenomenon that is especially true for the
production of high-tech products such as sedans and computers. Furthermore, the local
content rate may directly affect a product's quality or influence consumers' belief on the
product's quality. In 2004, BMW Brilliance (China) found that customers were afraid
that the enhanced local content rate may harm the quality of BMW cars, especially for
high-end cars, and it seems that such concern could not be alleviated easily [13].
In this thesis, we focus on the local content rate decision for multinational firms.
Motivated by the fact that the competition between two firms widely exists in practice,
we consider a duopoly setting in which a multinational firm and a local firm compete in a
2

market, and determine the impact of the competition and some other key factors on the
multinational firm's local content decision. When the multinational firm's local content
rate varies, the quality of his product may also change, which may induce the firm to
change the price for his product. As a response, the local firm may also change the price
of her product. Therefore, the prices for both firms' products should be considered
as two decision variables. For the duopoly analysis, we analyze a two-stage decision
problem, in which the multinational firm first makes his optimal decision on the local
content rate, and the multinational and the local firms then make their pricing decisions
with no communication ("simultaneously").
Since in reality, most of developed countries (e.g., Japan, Germany, the United
States) do not impose any local content requirements on the products that are made
by multinational firms, we first analyze the competition assuming that there is no local
content requirements in the local market. For this case, we find the two firms' price
in Nash equilibrium and the optimal local content rate for the multinational firm. Our
analysis shows that, to determine the optimal local content rate, the multinational
firm should trade off the cost and the quality of his product, and consider the product
substitutability between the product of the multinational firm and that of the local firm,
the sensitivity of consumers' valuation to product M's quality, and the slope of reduction
in marginal utility of two firms' products.
We find that the multinational firm sets a lower local content rate when the competition between the products of the multinational and the local firms is higher, consumers'
valuation is more strongly affected by the quality of the multinational firm's product,
and the reduction in consumers' marginal utility is smaller. Moreover, the demand for
the multinational firm's product and profit decrease if consumers are more sensitive to
the quality of the multinational firm's product or the tariff rate is increased. In addition
to our analytical results, we also perform numerical experiments and find a number of
managerial insights regarding the impact of the product substitutability the two firms'
decisions and profits.
In practice, many developing countries impose the local content requirements (LCRs)
to "force" multinational firms in their countries to improve the firms' local content rates
and thus increase the profitability of local suppliers. Under an LCR, a multinational
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firm absorbs a penalty tariff if the local content rate of the firm's product is smaller
than the required minimum local content rate-which can be simply regarded as the
LCR threshold. For the automobile industry many governments have implemented the
LCRs. In December 2010, Russia raised the LCR threshold from 30 to 60 percent for
foreign automakers to enjoy duty-free import of components [32]. In September 2011,
the Brazilian government announced an up to 30% increase in the industrial products
tax on cars with less than 65% locally-manufactured or other Mercosur states sourced
components [12]. Other examples include South Africa (55% for all vehicles), Argentina
(70% for all vehicles), Colombia (33% for some categories of vehicles), Chile (13% for
vehicles assembled from completely knocked-down kits and 3% for those assembled from
semi-knocked down kits), and Pakistani (the LCR threshold varies for different types of
vehicles), etc. [32] In a survey conducted by the United States Commerce Department,
83 percent of private sector respondents believed that their industries are more or less
affected by the LCRs [26].
According to the above, in this thesis we also examine the duopoly problem under a
local content requirement with a threshold and a penalty tariff rate. For such a problem,
we also compute the Nash equilibrium-characterized prices for two firms, and obtain the
optimal local content rate for the multinational firm. From our analytical and numerical
discussions, we learn that an LCR policy may induce the multinational firm to increase
his local content rate and move benefits from the multinational firm to the local firm.
However, a very high threshold for the LCR policy may cause the multinational firm
to adopt a low local content rate, resulting in a low demand and profit for both the
multinational firm and the local firm.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review major
publications that are closely related to this thesis to show the originality of our problem.
In Section 3, we consider a two-stage game problem in which there is no LCR on the
multinational firm. We compute the optimal local content rate decision and two firms'
pricing decisions in Nash equilibrium. In Section 4 we investigate the impact of important parameters on the multinational firm's optimal local content rate, the demands for
two products and two firms' profits. In Section 5, we investigate our two-stage duopoly
problem under an LCR with a threshold and a penalty tariff rate, determine the two
4

firms' decisions under the setting and perform sensitivity analysis to examine the impact
of the LCR threshold and the penalty tariff rate on the two firms. The thesis ends with
a summary of major findings in Section 6.

2

Literature Review

A number of papers have investigated the price and quality competition between two
firms. Wauthy [34] considered a two-stage game where multiple firms first decide the
quality level of their products simultaneously and then compete in price simultaneously.
The author found that the decisive factor for the extent of product differentiation is the
distribution of consumers' taste. Banker et. al. [3] examined the impact of competition
on Nash equilibrium-based quality levels when the competition intensity is interpreted
as the number of firms in the market, the extent of cooperation among firms in setting
quality levels, or the amount of intrinsic demand. They found that the equilibrium quality level is affected by many factors. For instance, if price responsiveness is relatively low,
then the equilibrium strategy for a weaker firm-who faces a relatively small intrinsic
demand but has a relative cost advantage in quality improvement-is to select a higher
quality level than the dominant firm. Brekke et. al. [4] showed that the income effects
on the demand side and the cost dependence between output and quality on the supply
side mainly determine the impact of competition on quality. In this thesis, assuming
the quality level of the local firm's product as a constant, we focus on the multinational
firm's decision on his local content rate, which can affect the firm's product quality.
The local content-related studies mostly appear in the economics literature, and
they mainly concern (i) the impact of the LCRs on the macroeconomic production
and welfare, and (ii) the optimal LCR threshold for policy makers. Some publications
are concerned with the competition between multinational firms and local firms, which
produce substitutable products in a competing market involving two or more firms.
Davidson et al. [8] analyzed the competition in a duopoly market, and concluded that
both the LCRs and the export requirements can reduce the world-wide output, the
world-wide welfare, and the source country's welfare. Lopez-de-Silanes et al. [9] focused
on the impact of the LCRs on the condition under which a multinational firm depends
5

more on the imported components than on the local components, whereas the local firm
is more dependent on the local components. Lahiri and Ono [23] considered the scenario
that a government uses both a profit tax and an LCR as two policy instruments to affect
the FDI under the assumption that the number of domestic firms is constant. Lahiri
and Ono [24] investigated a competitive case in which multinational firms located in
a country and export all of their products to another country where the multinational
firms compete with a domestic firm. Lahiri and Mesa [22] examined the volatility of the
exchange rate in both multinational firms' parent countries and an host country where
those firms operate, and analyzed a problem in which the multinational firms and the
firms in the host country compete in a third country where no firm makes the products.
From our literature review we learn that, regarding the competition between multinational firms and local firms-which produce substitutable products in a competing
market involving two or more firms, most extant publications in the economics field
assumed that a multinational firm's local content rate is always equal to the required
local content rate, which represents the minimum proportion of the components that
must be purchased from local suppliers. Accordingly, it has been commonly assumed
that the total acquisition cost of components produced in the local market with the
LCRs is always higher than the total cost of imported components; see, e.g., Davidson
et al. [8], Lahiri and Ono [23] and [24], and Lahiri and Mesa [22]. However, in practice,
some imported components may be cheaper than the locally sourced ones. Thus, in this
thesis, for generality, we do not assume that all imported components are cheaper than
local ones.
The publications reviewed above also assumed that multinational firms compete with
the producers of substitutable products in the Cournot setting. However, except for
raw materials, two or more products made by different firms are seldom homogeneous.
For example, BMW has never set the same price as Xiali's, which is an old Chinese
automobile brand. In the thesis, we also consider the price competition rather than the
quantity competition.
Some OM literatures investigate the impact of the tax on a firm's sourcing decision.
Horst [16] examined the effects of the tariff and the profit tax on a monopolistic firm's
production and exporting decisions. Hsu et al. [17] found the optimal production and
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distribution decisions for a multinational firm under a set of China's export-oriented
policies; under the policies, an exported product and its imported materials and components are exempted from tariffs and value-added taxes. Avittathur et al. [2] investigated
the decision of distribution centers under the differential sales tax structure in the Indian
central tax system.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few OM publications concerning the
effect of the LCRs on the manufacturing system. Munson and Rosenblatt [29] developed
a single plant model to analyze the purchasing allocation problem under the LCRs, and
examined the impact of different LCR-related schemes and obtained the following findings. First, under a value-based LCR scheme, firms should purchase local components
with a low relative cost penalty (i.e., local cost/foreign cost), no matter whether the
calculation of the local content is based on the value of the final product or on the sum
of all components' acquisition values. Secondly, under a physical content protection
scheme, firms should buy local components with a low absolute cost penalty (i.e., local
cost-foreign cost). Li et al. [25] solved material sourcing problems under an ROO
("Rules of Origin") value-added rule, and extended Munson and Rosenblatt's model
[29] by allowing some products to be dissatisfied with the LCRs and incorporating the
influences of transportation costs that differ in different countries. To analyze multinational firms' sourcing pattern, Li et al. [25] assumed that a multinational firm always
keeps its profit element unchanged when the firm chooses a local content rate.
Kouvelis et al. [20] focused on a multinational firm's international location decisions
rather than local content rate decision, even though the impact of the LCRs was considered. Moreover, the authors incorporated subsidies, trade tariffs, and taxation issues
to investigate the trade-offs in the design of global facility networks. Guo et al. [15]
analyzed a multi-stage production sourcing problem, considering production costs and
tariff concessions arising from a value-added local content scheme.
There are three main differences between this thesis and extant OM publications.
First, extant OM publications did not consider the competition between a multinational
firm and a local firm, which will be investigated in the thesis. Secondly, extant OM
publications did not incorporate the impact of a firm's local content rate on its product's
quality and the demand for the product; but, we will investigate such an impact in
7

the thesis. Thirdly, extant OM publications built mixed integer programming models,
whereas we will consider a two-stage decision problem involving a "simultaneous-move"
game and an optimal decision problem.
Different from the aforementioned papers, this thesis will study local content rate
from the point of view of a multinational firm rather than a host country, and consider
the competition between the multinational firm and a local firm. We analyze a two-stage
game to derive the optimal local-content decision for the multinational firm and pricing
decisions for both the multinational firm and the local firm. Since LCR is applied for
some countries but not for others, we consider the game in both situations. In addition,
the thesis incorporates the impact of local content rate on the quality of the product
of the multinational firm. This significantly distinguishes the thesis from the existing
literature.

3

The Two-Stage Model and Analysis with No Local
Content Requirement

In this section the multinational firm and the local firm compete in a country where
there is no requirement on a minimum local content of the multinational firm's product.
Note that, in reality, most of developed countries (e.g., Japan, Germany, the United
States) do not impose any local content requirements on the products that are made
by multinational firms. In such a competitive setting, the multinational firm makes
decisions on the sale price p and the local content rate of his product a-which is the
percentage of the value of local components in the product, and the local firm determines
the sale price of her product

p. We learn from the practice that most multinational

firms' local-content rate decisions are unlikely to change as frequently as their pricing
decisions, which may be attributed to the operational cost arising from component
changes. Accordingly, for such a competition we investigate the following two-stage
decision problem: In the first stage, the multinational firm maximizes his profit to
determine an optimal local content rate (i.e., the optimal percentage of the value of the
local components in the firm's product). In the second stage, the multinational and the
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local firms make their pricing decisions "simultaneously" (with no communication).
Remark 1 We use the backward induction approach to solve our two-stage problem.
That is, we adopt the following three steps:
1. In the first step, given the value of the local content rate a, we solve a "simultaneous-

move" game where the multinational firm and the local firm maximize their profits
to determine the Nash equili bri urn-characterized prices pN (a) and fiN (a), respectively.
2. In the second step, we substitute pN (a) and fiN (a) into the multinational firm's
profit function and maximize it to find the optimal local content rate a*.
3. In the third step, we compute the two firms' pricing decisions pN(a*) and pN(a*)
in Nash equilibrium.

3.1

•

Demand Functions

Prior to solving our two-stage problem, we develop the demand functions for the products of the multinational and the local firms, which are simply called "M" and "L,"
respectively. Since in practice each consumer can buy one or more of product M, product L, or both, we need to analyze a consumer's purchasing decision problem and derive
the demand function for each product. In this paper, the two firms are assumed to serve
a market involving a finite number of consumers whose utilities are quasilinear and concave. As Engl and Scotchmer [11] showed, under the above assumption, there must
be a "representative consumer," whose utility function can be viewed as an aggregate
utility function and then used to derive the aggregate demand. Note that the representative consumer's utility function may or may not be quasilinear; see, e.g., Singh and
Vives [31]. The analysis of a representative consumer's utility for the aggregate demand
has been widely used in the operations management field; see, e.g., Arya, Frimor, and
Mittendorf [1], Chen, Vakharia, and Alptekinoglu [5], Christen [7], Goyal and Netessine
[14], Kurtulu§ and Toktay [21], Lus and Muriel [27], etc.
Next, we construct a representative consumer's net utility function and maximize it
to find the aggregate demand function for each product. In practice, consumers usually

9

take the quality into account when they make purchasing decisions, which reflects the
fact that multinational firms' decisions on local content rates are related to the desired
quality levels of their products. Therefore, we should consider how the local content
rate of M influences consumers' utility by affecting the product M's quality in the
representative consumer's utility function. As discussed in Section 1, we focus on the
practice that a multinational firm's parent country possesses more advanced technology
than the host country does. Accordingly, we assume that components imported by the
multinational firm contain a higher technology and thus can be used to manufacture a
product of a higher quality. In equation 1, g(o:) reflects the reduction in M's quality.
Specifically, when the multinational firm's local content rate is increased from zero (i.e.,
all components are imported) too:, the quality level of product M is reduced by g(o:) and
the representative consumer's utility from each unit of product M is decreased by Bg(o:),
where

e 2: 0 denotes the degree to which the customer concerns the quality level of a

product. Consumers may under- or over- react to the change of the product's quality.
Therefore, the value of e could be very small. For instance, if the consumer's preference
on a product is its brand, then his or her valuation on the product may not be sensitive
to the quality. The value of e may be larger than 1. For example, if the consumer cares
a lot about the local content rate of product M, then his or her belief in the quality
may be greatly affected by the local content rate; as a result, his or her valuation on
the product may dramatically decrease even though the quality of the product M just
slightly reduces when the local content rate increases. When the product M is fully
made of imported components, there is no quality decrease in the product M, and thus

g(O)

= 0.

In our paper the quality level of product L is constant because the product is independent of the local content rate. Jerath and Zhang [18] stated that consumer's utility
drawn from a service is affected by the quality of another service. Similarly, we assume
that a higher quality level of M can result in a decrease in the consumer's utility drawn
from consuming product L. The assumption can be shown through the fact that when
laptops with higher-end CPU are introduced into market, existing laptops depreciate.
Such an impact is reflected by the substitutability index J.L E (0, 1) between products M
and L. For simplicity, we call J.L the M-1 substitutability index. It then follows that,
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when the local content rate for product M is increased from zero to a, the representative
consumer's utility from a unit of product L is increased by ftOg(a). Denoting the aggregate demands of products MandL by D and

D, we can compute the representative

consumer's quality-related utility as,

(1)

Remark 2 We learn from practice that multinational firms' foreign direct investments
(FDI) mainly stem from the important fact that the firms desire to expand their global
market shares using advanced and mature technologies. This means that, in general,
the imported components that are produced with advanced technologies have a higher
quality level than the local components. Thus, as the quality level of a final product
is largely dependent on the quality levels of its components, increasing the value of
the local content rate a will result in the replacement of more imported components
with local ones and hence the reduction in the quality level of the final product. In
addition, we recall from Section 1 that, before buying a product, a consumer may have
a perceived evaluation on the quality of the product. That is, as a increases, even if the
product's real quality does not change, the consumer may still reduce the quality level
of the product.
From the above argument, we conclude that as a result of increasing the local content
rate a, the reduction in the quality level g(a) increases, i.e., ag(a)jaa > 0, which
means that the representative consumer's valuation on product M decreases. Moreover,
8 2 g(a)j8a 2

> 0 for a

E (0, 1), which indicates that the marginal reduction in the quality

level of product M is an increasing function of a.

•

Similar to Dixit [10] and Singh and Vives [31], we write the representative consumer's quality-independent utility function in a quadratic and strictly concave form,
i.e., U2(D, D) = oD + JD- (K,D 2 + kD 2 + 2~tDD)/2, where o,

8, "'·

and k are positive

parameters. Using the above, we can calculate the consumer's net utility function as the
total utility [i.e., U1 (D,
where p and

D)+ U2(D, D)]

minus the consumer's purchase cost pD + pD,

p denote the unit price of product M and that of product L, respectively.
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That is,

U(D, D)

=

U1 (D, D)+ U2 (D, D)- pD- pD

= (8- Bg(a))D + (8 + B11g(a))D- ~(~~;D 2 + P;,D 2 + 211DD)
-pD- pD,

(2)

which is strictly concave when the following three inequalities are satisfied.

Note that Equation (2) is similar to the utility function developed by Jerath and
Zhang [18]; and, the local content rate influences the intrinsic demand of a product but
does not affect the slope of consumers' utility. By analyzing important parameters in
the model, we can obtain some managerial insights. For instance, the substitutability
index 11 can be used to reflect the intensity of competition. As 11 increases, the two
firms' products become more similar, and the competition between the two firms thus
is fiercer. Parameters

~~;

and P;, represents the slopes of reduction in consumers' utility

for product M and L, respectively.
Assuming that ~~; > 0, P;, > 0, and ~~;Pi,

-

112 > 0, we can solve the first order condi-

tions (i.e., oU(D, D)/oD = 0 and oU(D, D)joD = 0) to obtain the optimal demands
maximizing U(D, D) in (2) as,

(3)

(4)

In practice, the price of a product usually has a higher impact on the demand for
the product than the price of the other product. This implies that, in (3) and (4),

~~;

> 11

and k > /1, which assure that U(D, D) in (2) must be strictly concave. However, when
~~;

> 11 and k > fl, both D* and D* could be negative. Observing (3) and (4) we find a
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necessary condition assuring that D* 2: 0 and D* 2: 0 as
It thus follows from the above that the parameters
given such that "' > J.L, R > J.L, OR- 8J.L > 0, and

o,

8,

oR- 8J.L > 0 and 3,..,- OJ.L > 0.
K.,

R, and J.L in (2) should be

3,..,- OJ.L > 0.

As shown in (3) and (4), the demand D* (D*) are increasing in

o(8) but decreasing

in 8 (o). Specifically, a larger value of o results in a higher demand for the multinational
firm, whereas a larger value of 8 makes the multinational firm worse. In addition, D*
is decreasing in g(a) but D* is increasing in g(a), which is in agreement with the fact
that the demand for a product is dependent on the quality level of the product.

3.2

Model and Analysis of the Pricing Game

In this section, we consider the first step in which, given the local content rate a, the
multinational and the local firms determine their prices with no communication. Next,
we start by constructing the profit functions for the two firms, which is then used to
obtain the two firms' prices in Nash equilibrium.
3.2.1

Profit Functions

We first develop the multinational firm's profit function II. As indicated in Section 3.1,
the multinational firm sells D* units of product M, where D* is given in (3). Since the
unit price of product M is p, the multinational firm achieves the sale revenue pD*. For
each unit of product M, the multinational firm incurs the cost M(a), which includes
the unit (a-dependent) acquisition cost of all components C(a), the unit assembly cost
CA, and the tariff generated from the imported components. Denoting the unit tariff-

exclusive cost of all imported components by C1, we can calculate the tariff absorbed
by the multinational firm as tC1 , where t is the tariff rate. Thus, the firm's total unit
cost is M(a) = C(a)

+ CA + tC1 •

From the above, we find that the total unit cost of all local components is C(a)- C 1 ,
which is dependent on the percentage of local contents in product M (i.e., the local
content rate a). Such a dependence can be described by two common schemes, according
to Munson and Rosenblatt [29]. The first scheme is "physical content protection scheme"
under which a is the ratio of the total number of local components to that of imported
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components. Since the scheme is usually used for homogeneous intermediate products,
it does not apply to our problem. The second scheme is "value-based content protection
scheme" under which a is the ratio of the unit cost of all local components to either the
unit cost of all components (i.e., C(a)) or the value of the final product.
In this thesis, the multinational firm's profit function involves the total cost of all
components rather than the number of each component. Hence, we assume that the
firm applies the value-based content protection scheme, under which the local content
rate a is the ratio of the total cost of all local components to the total tariff-exclusive
cost of all components for one unit of the final product, i.e.,

_ C(a)- C1 _ _ _0_
aC(a)
- 1 C(a)'

(5)

Since the local content rate is the multinational firm's decision, we use (5) to write C1
as a function of a, i.e., C1 = (1- a)C(a).
Using the above, we re-write the multinational firm's total unit cost function M(a)
as,

M(a) = C(a)[1 + t(1- a)]+ CA.

(6)

Given a specific local content rate, a rational firm needs to locally source the components
that minimize the total acquisition cost. As Munson [29] discussed, under a valuebased content protection scheme, a multinational firm should first purchase the local
components with low relative cost penalties. Note that the relative cost penalty for a
component is defined as the ratio of the unit cost of a local one to that of an imported one.
Therefore, as a increases, more local components with higher relative cost penalties are
purchased; that is, the cost (benefit) of replacing one more imported component with a
local one becomes larger (smaller) when the local content rate a is greater. This implies
that C(a) should be a convex function of a, i.e. {) 2C(a)j{)a 2 ~ 0 for a E (0, 1), which
means that the marginal cost is increasing in a. Since there is similar logic for M(a),
it follows that {) 2 M(a)j{)a 2 ~ 0, for a E (0, 1).
Remark 3 Although C(a) is convex, we cannot assume the sign of the first-order derivative {)C(a)j{)a. For our subsequent analysis, we consider three possible scenarios: (i)

14

Scenario I: C(a) is increasing in a, i.e., C'(a) > 0, for a E (0, 1); (ii) Scenario D: C(a)
is decreasing in a, i.e., C'(a) < 0, for a E (0, 1); (iii) Scenario C: C(a) is a unimodal,
convex function of a, i.e., C'(O) < 0, and C'(1) > 0.

•

Then, we can construct the multinational firm's profit function as,

I1

= pD*- M(a)D* = V(a)D*,

where V(a)

=p- M(a),

(7)

where D* and M(a) are given as in (3) and (6), respectively, and V(a) represents the
multinational firm's unit profit. Similar to the above, we can compute the local firm's
profit as the total sale revenue pD* minus the total acquisition cost (6A+ C1)D*, where

6A

and C1 denote the local firm's unit assembly cost and unit acquisition cost of all

components, respectively. That is,

where

3.2.2

fJ• is given as in (4) and V(a) means the local firm's unit profit.
Prices in Nash Equilibrium

Given the value of the local content rate a, we solve a "simultaneous-move" game where
the multinational and the local firms maximize their profits II and

fi,

respectively, and

find two firms' a-dependent prices in Nash equilibrium (pN(a),pN(a)).

Proposition 1 Given the multinational firm's local-content rate a, the multinational
firm's and the local firm's a-dependent prices in Nash equilibrium can be uniquely
obtained as,

pN(a) =

PN (a)

=

4KK ~

J.l2 [2~~:KM(a)-

(2KK + KJ.L

2-~-L 2 ) Og(a) +

K/-l ( CA +

+2KK8 - /-lK8 - l-l2 8] ,
1
2
'
2 [K~-LM(a) + (K + 2KK- ~-L ) 1-l()g(a) + 2KK
4KK- J.l

+2~~:K8- ~-LK8 -~-L 2 8] .

cl)
(9)

(cA + cl)
(10)
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Proof. We calculate the first- and the second-order derivatives of IT in (7) w.r.t. p as

follows:

an

•

£:1 = D -

up

•

Pi,

KK -

11-

V (a)
2

and

a2 rr
!:!...2

uy

= -

•

2K

KK-

11- 2 < 0,

which implies that IT is a strictly concave function of the price p. Next, we differentiate
the local firm's profit function

afi

~ =

up

.

D*-

,

K,t~;

fi in (8) once and twice w.r.t. p, and find,
"'
-

.

11-

V(a)
2

and

2
a!l-:.2
fi

u1'

=- ,

2~~;

~~;~~;

-

11-2 < 0,

fi is also strictly concave in p.
Solving an; ap = 0 and afij ap = 0, we can attain the Nash equilibrium-characterized

which means that

prices for two firms as in (9) and (10).
The Nash equilibrium is unique if la2 rrjap2 l >

la2 ITjapapl+la 2 fijapapl

and

la2fija[J 2 1>

la 2 nlapapl + la2 filapapl, a condition identified by Milgram and Roberts [28]. Since
a2 nlapap = a2 filapap = 11-l (~~;Pi,- 11-2 ), ~~; > 11-, and Pi,> 11-, the equilibrium is unique. •
We note from Proposition 1 that, given the value of a, the multinational firm's
unit cost M(a) and the reduction in the quality level of product M g(a) affect the
a-dependent Nash-equilibrium prices. Next, we discuss the impact of the two terms on
the prices.

Since~~;

> J.L,

Pi,

> /-L, and all of other parameters are positive, we find from (9)

and (10) that, when M(a) increases, both firms should respond by raising their prices.
Recalling from (6) that M(a) = [C(a)

+ CA + tC1],

we conclude that both firms will

increase their prices if the multinational firm incurs a higher tariff-exclusive acquisition
cost or assembly cost or faces a larger tariff rate. In addition, the coefficient of M(a) in

pN (a) and that in pN (a) are 2~~;P;, I (4~~;P;, -

11-2 ) and K/-L I (4r;,P;, - 11-2 ), respectively. As ~~;

any change in M (a) results in more than twice the impact on

pN (a)

than on

> 11-,

pN (a).

Next, we utilize Proposition 1 to analyze the impact of the a-dependent quality level
of product M on the prices in Nash equilibrium. Since
2~~;Pi,+ ~~;11- 2 - 11-2

~~;

> 11- and

Pi,

> 11-, we find that

> 0. Hence, given the value of a, the multinational firm should determine

a higher price if the reduction in the quality level of product M g(a) is smaller. This
happens because of the following two reasons: First, for a given value of a, a smaller

g( a) implies that the quality of the local components used by the multinational firm are
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improved by their producers, and the multinational firm can thus produce high-quality
products. Second, although the local content rate is not changed, a reduction in the
value of g( a) reflects the improvement of consumers' confidence in the quality of product
M, which also results from the rise in the quality level of local components. We learn
from (10) that, because of R + 2KR- J.L 2 > 0, pN(a) decreases if g(a) is reduced. That
is, the local firm's price pN(a) is decreasing in the quality level of product M, which
differs from the impact of g(a) on pN(a). Our above discussion indicates that, as a
consequence of improving the quality level of local components, the multinational firm
will increase his sale price pN(a) whereas the local firm decreases her sale price pN(a).

3.2.3

Demands and Profits in Nash Equilibrium-Characterized Prices

We now discuss demands and the two firms' profits in terms of Nash equilibriumcharacterized prices.

Corollary 1 Given the multinational firm's local-content rate a, when the multinational and the local firms adopt their Nash equilibrium-based prices as in Proposition
1, the multinational firm's unit profit VN(a), the demand for product M DN(a), and
the multinational firm's total profit fiN(a) are computed as,
1
2
2
~
[- (2KR- J.L ) M(a)- (2Kk + KJ.L 4KK- J.L 2

+KJ.L ( CA

+ Ct) + 2Kk8- KJ.LJ- j.L 2 8]'

kVN(a)j(Kk-

J.L 2 )

Og(a)
(11)

J.L 2 ),

2

R [VN(a)] /(Kk- J.L 2 ).

Proof. This corollary follows from substituting pN (a) and pN (a) into the demand
function in (3) and the profit function in (7). •
We learn from (11) that the multinational firm's local content rate a impacts VN(a),

DN(a), and fiN(a) in a similar manner. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, given the value
of a, the multinational firm should choose a higher price when his product's quality
increases and the firm's cost M(a) rises. Using Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, we can
draw some insights as follows:
1. A higher value of M(a) increases pN(a) but reduces VN(a), DN(a), and fiN(a).
17

This implies that, as a result of raising M( a), the increase in the multinational
firm's sale revenue is smaller than the increase in the firm's cost, thus not only
discouraging consumers from buying the product but also decreasing the firm's
unit profit. Such a result can be demonstrated by the fact that the coefficient of

M(a) in (9)-i.e., 2Kk/ (4Kk -~-L 2 )-is positive and less than 1.
2. When the local firm incurs a higher total unit cost (i.e.,

CA + C1 is

larger), the

multinational firm should increase his price pN (a) and achieves a higher unit profit
VN(a), a larger demand DN(a), and a greater total profit TIN(a). The impact

of the local firm's cost on VN(a) is mainly attributed to the fact that increasing
the value of CA

+ C1 does not

affect the multinational firm's cost even though it

raises the price pN(a). Recall from (3) that, in the multinational firm's demand
function, the coefficient of pis negative but that of pis positive, and the absolute
value of the coefficient of p is larger than that of p. Since both DN (a) and pN (a)
increase as a result of increasing the value of

6A + C1,

we can conclude that an

increase in the local firm's cost causes much smaller increase in pN(a) than in

pN(a).
3. When the reduction in the quality level of product M g( a) is reduced, we find that
pN (a), V N(a), DN (a), and TIN (a) are all increased. This means that if product

M is of higher quality or consumers have a greater confidence in the quality of
product M, then the multinational firm can not only enjoy a higher price but also
attract more consumers.
Similar to the above, we can calculate the local firm's unit profit, demand, and total
profit when two firms choose their prices in Nash equilibrium, as shown in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2 Given the multinational firm's local-content rate a, when the multina-

tional firm and the local firm adopt their prices as in Proposition 1, the local firm's
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a-dependent unit profit tiN(o:), demand D(o:), and total profit fiN(o:) are computed as,

tiN(o:)

=

1

4~k _ J.L2

[A:J.LM(o:) +(A:+ 2~k- J.L 2 ) J.LBg(o:)-

(2~k- J.L2 ) ( CA + Ct)

+2~~8- J.L 28- J.L~8] '
b(o:) = ~tiN(o:)f(~~- J.L 2 ),

(12)

(13)
Proof. Substituting pN(o:) and pN(o:) into the demand function in (4) and the profit
function in (8) yields the results in this corollary. •
The above corollary indicates that, as the value of o: changes, tiN (o:), fJN (o:), and

fiN(o:) vary in a similar manner. Given the value of o:, we learn from Section 3.2.2 that
the local firm raises her price when the firm and the multinational firm incur higher
costs, or the multinational firm reduces his product's quality level. Using Proposition 1
and Corollary 2, we find that an increase in the local firm's cost 6A+ C1 leads the firm to
increase her sale price pN(o:) but achieves a lower unit profit tiN(o:), a smaller demand

fJN (o:), and a smaller total profit fiN (o:). Moreover, an increase in the multinational
firm's cost M( o:) raises pN (o: ), tiN (o: ), fJN (o: ), and fiN (o: ); and pN (o: ), tiN (o: ), fJN (a),
and fiN (o:) rise as a result of increasing g( a).

3.3

Optimal Local Content Rate

Using the prices in Nash equilibrium as in Proposition 1, we now determine the multinational firm's optimal local content rate a* that maximizes the firm's profit IIN(o:) =

2
~ [VN(a)] /(~~- J.L 2 ), which is given as in (11). Since~,~' and J.L are exogenous parameters, the optimal rate maximizing II N(o:) is identical to that maximizing the multinational firm's a-dependent unit profit VN(o:) in (11). Specifically, when avN(o:)jaa = 0,

arrN(o:)faa =

o.

Differentiating V N (a) once and twice with respect to o: yields,

avN (a)

aa
a2vN(o:)
8a2

=

-

= -

,

1

4~~-

,

J.L 2

1

4~K-

J.L 2

[(2~~- J.L 2 )

M'(o:) +

(2~~ + ~J.L 2 - J.L 2 ) Bg'(o:)],

[(2~k- J.L2 ) M"(a) + (2~~ + ~J.L 2 - J.L2 )
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Bg"(o:)].

(14)

In the above equations, M'(a) and M"(a) [i.e., the first- and second- order derivatives
of M(a)] are,

+ t (1- a)] C'(a)- tC(a),

M'(a)

[1

M"(a) =

[1 + t (1- a)] C"(a)- 2tC'(a),

(15)

which are obtained by differentiating M(a) = C(a) [1 + t(1- a)]+ CA once and twice
w.r.t. a.
As discussed in Section 3.1, g"(a) > 0 and M"(a) ~ 0. Thus, fJ2VN(a)j8a 2 < 0 for
a E

[0, 1], which means that VN(a) is a strictly concave function of a. We learn from

Remark 3 that C(a) is a convex function but it may be increasing in a (i.e., C'(a) > 0),
may be decreasing in a (i.e., C'(a) < 0), or may be unimodal in a (i.e., C'(O) < 0 and
C'(1) > 0). Therefore, avN (a)joa (for a E [0, 1]) could be positive or negative, which
means that the optimal local content rate a* in the range [0, 1] may be equal to zero
when fJVN(a)joa < 0, may be equal to 1 when fJVN(a)joa > 0, or may be a unique
solution in the range (0, 1).
Proposition 2 The optimal local content rate a*-which maximizes the multinational
firm's profit ITN(a) in (11)---can be uniquely attained as,

+ M'(O) ~ 0,
if Sg'(O) + M'(O) < 0 < Sg'(1) + M'(1),

0, if Sg'(O)

a*=

a,

1, if Sg'(1) + M'(1) $ 0.
where S

=(2KR + Kf.J-

2

-

tJ- 2 ) () / (2KR- tJ-2 ) > 0, and

a denotes a unique solution satis-

fying the following equation:
Sg'(a)

+ M'(a)

= 0.

(16)

Proof. We learn from our argument prior to this proposition that 8 2 VN(a)j8a 2 < 0
for a E [0, 1]. Thus, one of the following three cases must happen.
Case 1: VN(a) is strictly increasing in a for a E (0, 1). For this case, wehavefJVN(a)joa:::
0.

Since VN(a) is a strictly concave function, we find that, for a E (0, 1),
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8VN(a)j8a must be greater than zero if and only if 8VN(a)j8ala=l 2: 0, or,
Sg'(1)

+ M'(1)

(2KJ;, - f..L 2 )

<

where

0

> 0. Hence, for Case 1,

a*

S

= 1.

Case 2: v N(a) is strictly decreasing in a for a E (0, 1). For this case, we have av N(a) I aa

0. Similar to our analysis of Case 1, for a

E

(0, 1), avN(a)f8a must be smaller

than zero if and only if 8VN(a)f8ala=O ~ 0, or, Sg'(O)

+ M'(O) 2:

0. Therefore,

for Case 2, a• = 0.
Case 3: VN(a) is a unimodal, concave function of a for a E (0, 1). For this case,

avN(a)f8ala=O > 0 and avN(a)f8ala=1 < 0. There is a unique solution maximizing VN(a), which can be obtained as a• =&,where & satisfies the equation
in (16).
This proposition is thus proved. •
We note from (16) that M'(&)+Sg'(&) = 0, which implies that M'(&) < 0, since g'(a)
is positive. Thus, at the optimal local content rate a• (except boundary solutions), the
multinational firm does not enjoy the lowest cost-that satisfies the equation M'(a) = 0,
and raising the value of a can reduce M(a) but also result in a decrease in the demand
and the firm's unit profit. This implies that the multinational firm should consider the
trade-off between cost and product quality, in order to maximize his total profit.
Proposition 2 indicates that the optimal local content rate a• depends on the sign
of Sg'(O)

+ M'(O)

and that of Sg'(1)

+ M'(1).

Let

_ d[-M(a)]
dg(a) '

'Y (a ) =

which can be regarded as the increase in the multinational firm's cost when the quality
level of product M is increased by one unit, for a given value of the local content rate
a. For simplicity, 'Y(a) reflects the marginal cost of product M's quality. Recalling

that g' (a) > 0 but M' (a) may be positive or negative, we cannot determine the sign of
'Y(a). The positive (negative) value of 'Y(a) means the multinational firm's cost increase
(reduction) resulting from the decrease in the quality level. We note from the above
proposition that when a=&, the marginal profit of the multinational firm is zero, i.e.,
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<

aVN(a)jaala:=&

= 0. It then follows that S reflects the marginal cost of product M's

quality when marginal profit of product M's local content rate is 0, i.e., 'Y(ii) = S.
Remark 4 We learn from Proposition 2 that the multinational firm should not buy any
component from the local market but import all components if the corresponding quality
marginal cost 1'(0) is sufficiently small such that 'Y(O):::; S, i.e., Sg'(O) + M'(O) ? 0. All
components for product M should be bought from the local market if the corresponding
quality marginal cost 1'(1) is sufficiently large such that 1'(1) ? S, i.e., Sg'(1) + M'(1) :::;
0. In conclusion, the multinational firm's optimal decision on the local content rate is
dependent on the impact of the quality level of product M on the firm's cost.

•

Although the above remark indicates two possible results regarding the optimal local
content rate, the inequality 'Y(1) ? S (i.e., Sg'(1)

+ M'(1) :::; 0)

is still unlikely to hold,

because of the following two reasons. First, as usual, g'(1) is significantly large since the
quality of product M would be greatly decreased when the key components are localized.
Secondly, M' ( 1) should not be very small since M" (a) ? 0 for a E [0, 1]. It thus follows
that the multinational firm is unlikely to buy all components from local suppliers. This
is consistent with the fact that in practice very few high-technology multinational firms
adopt the localization rate of 100% and multinational firms are unwilling to localize the
components of high technology.
As Remark 1 indicates, to find the prices in Nash equilibrium for our two-stage
problem, we should replace a in the prices pN(a) in (9) and pN(a) in (10) with the
optimal local content rate a* in Proposition 2. To illustrate the above game analysis,
we provide the following numerical example, in which the multinational firm's tariffexclusive cost C(a) is assumed to be a convex function.
Example 1 A multinational firm makes FDI in a country to make use of the firm's
advanced technology, and make and sell product M to satisfy the demand D* in (3),
where 6

=

400,

J=

300,

e = 0.7,

which reflects the degree to which customers are

sensitive to product M's quality. The multinational firm competes with a local firm in
the market, and the substitution index of two firms' products is f-l = 0.6. Moreover, in
the representative consumer's utility function (2), "'
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= 1.5 and P;, = 1.5.

We assume the quality-related function g(o:) as,

where m and n are both positive. For this numerical example, we set m = 100 and

n = 0.4. The function g(o:) satisfies the properties that g'(o:) > 0 and g"(o:) > 0. Observing the fact that product M's quality significantly decreases when the multinational
firm localize his key components (e.g., the engine for sedan), we assume that g'(1) is
sufficiently large such that the inequality 1(1)

~

S (i.e., Sg'(1)

+ M'(1)

~

0) does not

hold. Note that g(O) = 0, since there is no quality decrease when all components for
product Mare imported (i.e., o: = 0).
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, C(o:) possesses the property that C"(o:)

~

0. For our

numerical study in this paper, we specify the cost function as,

where A1 , v1 , A2 , v2 ,and A3 are all positive. For this numerical example, we set A1 = 70,
v1 = 3, A2 =50, v 2 = 0.5 and A3 = 80; under such a setting, C(o:) is a convex function of

o:. In addition, the multinational firm's unit cost for each imported component includes
the tariff. We assume the tariff rate as 0.15, i.e., t = 0.15. The local firm's unit cost for
all components C1 is assumed to be 150. We also assume that both firms' unit assembly
costs are 5, i.e. CA = CA = 5. Recall from Proposition 2 that o:* =

aE

(0, 1) when

-M'(O) > Sg'(O) and -M'(1) < Sg'(1), which are satisfied in this example.
Next, solving the equation that arr.N(o:)/8o: = 0, we calculate the multinational
firm's optimal local content rate o:* as o:* =

a=

0.370. We then solve (9) and (10) to

find two firms' prices in Nash equilibrium as pN(o:*) = $262.947 and pN(o:*) = $207.201.
The resulting demands for products M and L are D* = 65.315 and D* = 41.429. The
two firms achieve their profits as rr.N(o:*) = $5375.271 and fiN(o:*) = $2162.636.
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4

Sensitivity Analysis and Managerial Implications

In this section, we perform the sensitivity analysis to explore the impact of some important parameters (in two firms' profit functions) on the multinational firm's optimal
local content rate, demand, and profit. The parameters include the tariff rate t, the M-L
substitutability index f.1, and others such as 0-the degree to which customers concern
the product quality-and the customers' utility parameter,. in (2). From our sensitivity
analysis we draw both the analytic and the numerical managerial insights.

4.1

The Impact of the Tariff Rate t

We start with the impact of the tariff rate t on the multinational firm's optimal localcontent decision a•, which may be zero, one, or

a E (0, 1), as indicated by Proposition

2.
Proposition 3 By increasing the tariff rate t from t 1 to t 2 , we obtain the following

results regarding the impact of the tariff rate on the multinational firm's optimal local
content rate decision a*.
1. If two tariff rates t 1 and t2 are given such that t 1 :5 t2 :5

l, where l

=[Sg'(O) +

C'(O)]/[C(O) - C'(O)], then the multinational firm's optimal local content rate
decision for each rate is zero, i.e., a*it=t 1 = a*it=t2 = 0.
2. If two tariff rates t 1 and t 2 are given such that t1 :5

l < t2, then 0 = a*it=t 1 <

a*it=t 2 when C'(O) < C(O), but a*lt=t 1 = a*it=t 2 = 0 when C'(O) 2:: C(O).
3. If two tariff rates t 1 and t2 are given such that

f = [Sg'(1)

+ C'(1)] /C(1),

l < t 1 < t2 and t1 < f, where

then 0 < a*lt=t 1 < a*it=t2 • In addition, a*lt=t2 = 1, if

t2 2:: f.
Proof. We learn from Proposition 2 that whether or not the multinational firm's optimal

local content rate a• is zero is dependent on the sign of Sg'(O)

+ M'(O).

According to

(15), we find that

M'(O)

= M'(a)ia=o = (1 + t)C'(O)- tC(O) = t[C'(O)- C(O)] + C'(O);
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and therefore, Sg'(O)

+ M'(O)

= Sg'(O)

then, for any tariff rate t > 0, Sg'(O)
Sg'(O)

+ M'(O)

+ t[C'(O) - C(O)] + C'(O). If C'(O) 2: C(O),

+ t[C'(O) - C(O)] + C'(O) 2:

0, which means that

must be non-negative. Otherwise, if C'(O) < C(O), then

t = Sg'(O) + C'(O)

Sg'(O)

+ M'(O) 2: 0,

if t <

{ Sg'(O)

+ M'(O) < 0,

if t > t.

-

C(O)- C'(O) '

Using the above, we have the following results:
1. If two tariff rates t 1 and t 2 are given such as t 1
ti (i = 1, 2), Sg'(O)

+ M'(O)

:::;

t2

:::;

t,

then for each tariff rate

is non-negative; and as Proposition 2 indicates, the

multinational firm's optimal decision on the local content rate is zero. That is, if

t1 :::; t2 :::;

t, then a* it=t = a* lt=t = 0.
2

1

2. If two tariff rates t 1 and t 2 are given such that t 1

:::;

t < t 2 , then the multinational

firm's optimal local content rate decision when t = t 1 must be zero, i.e., a* it=t 1 = 0,
but his optimal local content rare decision when t = t 2 > t may be a > 0 or may
be zero, which depends on the comparison between C'(O) and C(O). Specifically,
if C'(O) < C(O), then Sg'(O)

+ M'(O)

< 0 and a*it=t2 = a > 0, as suggested

by Proposition 2. Otherwise, if C'(O) 2: C(O), then Sg'(O)

3. If two tariff rates t 1 and t 2 are given such that
rate, the sign of Sg'(O)

+ M'(O)

t<

+ M'(O) >

0 and

t 1 < t 2 , then for each tariff

is negative. When t 2 2:

t,

Sg'(1)

+ M'(1) :::;

0.

It thus follows from Proposition 2 that when the tariff rate t 1 or t 2 applies, the
multinational firm determines his optimal local content rate decision as a* it=t 1 = a
and a*lt=t 2 = 1, respectively. That is, iff< t1 < t2, then 0 < a*it=t 1 < a*lt=t2 = 1.
When

t < t 1 < t 2 < t,

then when the tariff rate t 1 or t 2 applies, the multinational

firm always determines his optimal local content rate decision as

ait=t 1 is not equal to a2

= ait=t

2•

a.

But,

a1 =

Next we compare a 1 and a 2.

We note from the proof of Proposition 2 that for t >

t,

V N (a) in (11) must be

a concave function with a unique optimal solution a maximizing VN(a); that
is,

a uniquely satisfies

the first-order condition

25

av N (a) I fJa

= 0, which can be

simplified to (16). Letting vt(a) denote the multinational firm's profit function
when the tariff rate tis ti, fori= 1, 2, we find from the concavity of VN(a) that
0:1 < 0:2 if 8l/2N(a)/8ala=a 1 > 8Vf(a)joaia=a2 = 0. Therefore, to compare 0: 1
and 0:2, we should determine the sign of OV2N(a)joaia=ii 1 •

which must be positive if C'(D: 1) :::; 0.

In addition, the first-order condition

avt(a)joaia=iii = 0 can be re-written as,

or,

This means that, if C'(D: 1) > 0, then C(O:I) - C'(O:I)(1 - 0: 1) > 0 and thus

8Vf(a)joaia=a 1 > 0.
It follows from the above that, if two tariff rates t 1 and t 2 are given such that

l < t1 < t2, then 0:1 < 0:2.
We thus prove this proposition. •
We learn from the above proposition that a change in the tariff rate t may not
lead the multinational firm to adjust his optimal decision on the local content rate.
Specifically, when a* = 0, we find that if C'(O) < C(O) and the tariff rate t is increased
such that t ;:::: l, then the multinational firm should raise his optimal local content rate
from zero to 0: > 0 or 100%. Otherwise, the multinational firm should still fully use
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local components to make product M, i.e., a•

= 0.

Moreover, when a•

= 0:

E

(0, 1),

the multinational firm's optimal local content rate is increasing in the tariff rate t; and
the multinational firm will use only local components to manufacture product M if the
tariff rate t is increased such that t 2: l.
Remark 5 We derive from the above proposition that when the tariff rate t takes
different values, the multinational firm's optimal local content rate can be uniquely
determined as follows:
1. When C'(O) ~ C(O), a*= 0.

2. When C'(O) < C(O),
0, if t ~

a*=

t,

0:, if t < t < l,

1, if t 2: l.
This clearly shows that a tariff policy may not be useful in increasing a multinational
firm's local content rate, but the firm does not decrease his local content rate as the tariff
rate is increased. We find that C'(O) < C(O) is a necessary criteria for the multinational
firm to use some local components. In other words, if the marginal tariff-exclusive
acquisition cost is greater than or equal to the tariff-exclusive acquisition cost when
all components are imported, i.e., C'(O) 2: C(O), then the multinational firm's optimal
local content rate is always zero, and any change in the tariff rate cannot induce the
multinational firm to replace some imported components with the local ones. Recall that
C"(a)

~

0; in this situation the tariff-exclusive cost C(a) is extremely tremendously

increasing in a, and the increase in C(a) always exceeds the saving in the tariff when a
increases.

If C'(O) < C(O), then a tariff policy with a sufficiently high tariff rate (t >

t as is

defined in Proposition 3) can lead the multinational firm to use some local components,
and the increase in tariff rate can induce the firm to raise his local content rate.
Next, we discuss the impact of the tariff rate t on the demand for product M [i.e.,
DN(a*)] and the multinational firm's profit [i.e., rrN(a")].

Corollary 3 Both DN(a*) and rrN(a*) are decreasing in the tariff rate t.
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Proof. We learn from (11) that

which indicates that the impact oft on DN(a*) and TIN(a*) is dependent on only the
impact of t on V N (a*). For our proof, we consider two tariff rates t 1 and t 2 , and we,
without loss of generality, assume that t 1 < t 2 • The multinational firm's optimal local
content rate decisions corresponding to t 1 and t 2 are denoted by ai and

a;, respectively.

As Proposition 3 indicates, the multinational firm's optimal local content rate decision a*
is a non-decreasing function oft. Therefore, ai
firm's unit profit when t = ti by ViN(ai)

~

a;.

We also denote the multinational

= VN(a*)lt=tn fori= 1, 2.

We also learn from Proposition 3 that there are three possible cases for the values
of ai and a; as follows: (i) both ai and a; are equal to zero; (ii) ai is zero and a; > 0;
and (iii) a; > ai > 0. Next, we investigate these three cases:

Case 1: ai =a; = 0. For this case, the multinational firm's optimal local content rate
decision when t = t 1 is the same as that when t = t 2 • We use (11) to find

which is positive. That is, when ai =a;= 0, Vt(o) > Vf(O), which means that
the demand for product M [i.e., DN(a*)J and the multinational firm's profit [i.e.,

ll N (a*)] are both decreasing in t.

Case 2:

a; > ai = 0.

For this case, we find that, when t = t 1 , the multinational firm's

optimal local content rate ai maximizing the firm's profit TIN(a)-which is the
same as that maximizing V1N (a), as discussed in Section 3.3-is zero. This means
that Vt (a) reaches the maximum at the point a = ai = 0. Since Vt (a) is a
strictly concave function, as shown in Section 3.3, we have, ~N ( ai) = ~N (0) >

vlN(a;). Next, we compare vlN(a2) and v;N(a;). Similar to our above discussion
for Case 1, we use (11) to calculate
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which is positive. Therefore, Vt(ai) = Vt(O) > V1N(a2) > Vt(o:2), which
suggests that both DN(a*) and nN(a*) are both decreasing in t for Case 2.
Case 3: a2 > ai > 0. Similar to our argument in Case 2, we can show that Vt(ai) >

Vt(a2) > Vt(a2), which implies that both DN(a*) and nN(a*) are both decreas-

ing in t for Case 3.
According to the above, we prove this corollary. •
The above corollary implies that, even though an increase in the tariff rate t may
induce the multinational firm to raise his local content rate, the demand faced by the
firm and the firm's profit are both decreased. This may reduce the firm's incentive to
invest in the local market. Actually, before making investment, the multinational firm
needs to pay attention to the local tariff policy. If the tariff rate is so high that the
firm can earn only a little no matter how to change his local content rate, then the firm
probably should not invest in the market.

4.2

The Impact of the M-L Substitutability Index p,

We then examine the effect of J.L on the multinational firm's optimal local content rate
decision a*. Noting from Proposition 2 that a* is 0, a, or 1, we consider the impact of

J.L on the interior solution a, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 As the substitutability index J.L between products M and L increases,

i.e., the competition between the multinational and the local firms intensifies, the multinational firm should reduce his optimal local content rate

a, i.e., 8a/8J.L < 0.

Proof. Differentiating the two sides of (16) once w.r.t. J.L yields,

which is negative, because R, J.L, B, g'(a) > 0, g"(a*) > 0, and M"(a*) :::: 0. •
The above proposition implies that, when products M and L become similar and the
resulting competition between two firms is higher, the multinational firm should reduce
the local content rate to use more imported components, which can improve the quality
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of product M. However, such a strategy results in an increase in the multinational
firm's acquisition cost, because M'(a) < 0. Therefore, Proposition 4 shows that the
multinational firm's best response to a rise in the product substitutability is to spend
more to enhance the quality of product M rather than to save cost in the production of
product M.
We cannot analytically examine the impact of the product substitutability index

1-L

on the demand for product M and the multinational firm's profit because it is intractable
to determine the sign of the first-order derivative aVN(a)/8/-L, which is computed as,

=

~

1
[41-L (/-L 2 - 31\;K) M(a)
(41\;1\; - /-L2) 2

+/\; (4KI\; + I-L2 ) ( CA + Ct)-

+ (1- 21\;) 41\;Kf.L8g(a)

(41\;KJ + 4Kf.Lt5 + f.L t5) /\;].
2

(17)

Thus, we perform a numerical sensitivity analysis to investigate the impacts of 1-L on the
price and the demand for product M, and the multinational firm's and the local firm's
profits.
Next, for the numerical study, we consider all Scenario I, Scenario D, and Scenario
C, which are defined according to the property of the total tariff-exclusive acquisition
cost of all components [i.e., C(a)]. In order to make three scenarios comparable to
each other and examine the impact of three patterns of C(a), we specify C(a) in the
following form for all scenarios:

(18)

where the values of parameters Ai (i = 1, 2, 3) and vi (j = 1, 2) vary in three scenarios,
as given as follows.

1)1

A1

Scenario I [C'(a) > 0]
Scenario D [C'(a) < 0]
Scenario C [C"(a) ~ 0]

0
70
70

3
3
3

A2

50
0
50

1)2

0.5
0.5
0.5

Aa
150
130
80

Table 1: Values of parameters in three scenarios of tariff-exclusive unit cost
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Note from the above parameter values that C(O)-i.e., the multinational firm's acquisition cost when his local content rate is zero-is 200 for all three scenarios. This is
assumed to reflect the fact that C(O) is independent of the technology level in the local
market. We plot Figure 1 to illustrate the cost function C(a) for three scenarios.

Figure 1: The cost function C(a) for Scenario I [C'(a) > 0], Scenario D [C'(a) < 0],
and Scenario C [C"(a) >OJ.

In addition, for three scenarios, the function g( a) and all parameter values are specified as in Example 1, see a summary given as follows:

t
400

300

1.5

1.5

0.7

0.6

5

5

150

0.15

Table 2: Values of parameters in sensitivity analysis
Since the multinational firm owns more advanced technology than the local firm does,
if product M is fully made of imported components, then the quality level of product M
is much higher than that of product L. Thus we set 8 to be higher than

8.

Consumers

may over- or under- react to the change of quality of a product; correspondingly, () might
be larger than or less than 1. Thus () is set to be 0.7, which is larger than 0.5. From
Table 3 we find that, average tariff rates for electrical machinery and transportation
equipment range from 1.1% to 20.7%, and the maximum tariff rates may be as high
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as 139%. Therefore, we set the base value for t as 15%, which belongs to the range
of average tariff rates set by the nine countries and is higher than the mean of these
average tariff rates.
MFN applied
duties (%)

Electrical rnachinery AVE

China
Brazil
Russia
South Africa
India
Egypt
Canada
EU

8.3
14.1
7.4
4.6
7.2
8
1.1
2.8
1.7

u.s.

Transport
equipment
AVE
11.5
18.1
11.1
5.9
20.7
12.4
5.8
4.3
3

Electrical rnachinery MAX
35
20
29
25
10
30
9
14
15

Transport
equipment
MAX
45
35
139
30
100
135
25
22
25

Table 3: Tariff rates set by different countries. Note that AVG denotes average tariff rate
within the product group, MAX denotes the highest ad valorem duty within the product
group, and all the rates stated in the form are for MFN (Most favourated nation).
For our sensitivity analysis regarding the impact of ft, we use the value of It in
Example 1 (i.e., It = 0.6, as presented above) as the base value, and increase the value
of It from 0.1 to 0.9 in steps of 0.1 but keep other parameter values unchanged. For each
value of ft, we calculate a•, pN(a*), pN(a*), DN(a*), bN(a*), IJN(a*), and fiN(a*). To
facilitate our discussion, we plot Figures 2, 3, and 4-where the subscript i represents
Scenario i, fori= I, D, C-to show the impact of It on two firms' decisions, the demands
for two products, and two firms' profits, respectively.

Figure 2: The Impact of the M-L substitutability index ft on the optimal local content
rate a•, and the Nash equilibrium-characterized prices pN(a*) and pN(a*).

We learn from Figure 2(a) that the substitutability index ft does not generate any
significant impact on the multinational firm's optimal local content rate decision, and
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the impact of J1 on a:* shows almost the same pattern in three scenarios; that is, a:* keeps
the same or just slightly decreases as J1 increases. As Figure 2(b) and (c) indicates, as
the two firms' products (namely, Products M and L) become similar (i.e., the substitutability index 11 is greater), both pN (a:*) and pN (a:* )-two firms' pricing decisions in
Nash equilibrium-are reduced in all scenarios. According to Figure 3(a) and (b), we
find that, as 11 increases, the demands DN(o:*) and fJN(o:*) vary in a different manner.
Specifically, Figure 3( a) indicates that, when 11 rises, DN (a:•) first slightly decrease and
then slightly increase. Figure 3(b) shows that fJN(o:*) is significantly decreasing in ~tin
three scenarios.

(b)

Figure 3: The Impact of the M-L substitutability index J1 on the demand for product
M DN(a:*) and the demand for product L iJN(o:*).

We also learn from Figure 4 that, as a result of increasing the value of J1, both
II N (a:*) and

fiN (a:*)

significantly decrease. According to our previous analytical results,

the multinational firm should enhance the quality of product M as a response to the
increase in the M-L substitutability index J1. The decrease in the multinational firm's
profit when J1 increases is mainly ascribed to the facts that the increase of quality is
accompanied by the increase in cost, and that the price for product M decreases when
competition intensifies.
From Figures 2, 3, and 4 we learn that for three scenarios, each of pN(a:*), DN(a:"),
and IJN (a:*) changes in a similar manner, but its values significantly vary in different
scenarios. The difference is mainly ascribed to the disparity of the cost C(o:*) among
the three scenarios. However, each of pN(a:*), iJN(a:*), and fiN(o:*) has almost the
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4: The impact of the M-L substitutability index J.t on the multinational firm's
profit IIN(a"') and the local firm's profit fiN(a"').

same value in three scenarios; that is, C(a"') imposes a negligibly small impact on the
local firm. This implies that the multinational firm should consider a trade-off between
his cost and his profit; as a result, the effect of C(a*) could be absorbed only by the
multinational firm.

4.3

The Impact of the Parameter

e

We now investigate the effects of () on the multinational firm's optimal local content
rate decision, as shown in the following proposition.

Proposition 5 If consumers are more sensitive to the quality of product M, i.e., the
value of () increases, then the multinational firm should reduce his local content rate,
i.e., fJ&.jfJ() < 0.

Proof. Differentiating (16) once w.r.t. () and

K

yields,

because all parameters are positive; and g'(&.) > 0, g"(a*) > 0, and M"(a*)

~

0. •

Using the above proposition, we can find the impact of the parameters () on the
demand for product M and the multinational firm's profit, as presented in the following
corollary.
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Corollary 4 Both the demand for product M and the multinational firm's profit be-

come smaller, if consumers are more sensitive to the quality of product M, i.e., {)DN (a)ja() <
0 and {)fiN(&.)ja() < 0.
Proof. We compute the first-order derivative of DN(&.) w.r.t. ()as,

According to (16), we find that

which can be used to simplify aDN(a)j{)() to

We then calculate the first-order derivative of fiN(&.) w.r.t.

e, and find

The corollary is thus proved. •
The effects of () on the demand for product M and the multinational firm's local
content rate decision and profit are consistent with the fact that the multinational firm
is willing to spend more efforts to improve the quality of product M and thereby reduce
the local content rate, when consumers are more sensitive to the quality rather than
other factors.

4.4

The Impact of the Parameters "' and P;,

We now investigate the effects of

K,

and

P;,

on the multinational firm's optimal local

content rate decision, as shown in the following proposition.
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Proposition 6 If the reduction in consumers' marginal utility of either product M or
product L becomes larger, i.e., the value of"' or
should raise his local content rate, i.e.,

Pi,

increases, then the multinational firm

oa/ OK >

0 and

oa/ {)Pi, >

0. In addition, the

impact of"' on the value of a is less significant than that of k, and the impact of
the value of a is less significant than that of

k;

Proof. Differentiating (16) once w.r.t. "' and

Pi,

that is, loa/8~1 >

Pi,

on

l8a/8kl > loa/84

yields,

because all parameters are positive; and g'(a) > 0, g"(a*) > 0, and M"(a*) ~ 0.
The differences among

loa/ 8~1' loa/ OKI

1~:1-1~~1
1~:1-1~~1
~~~~-~~~~
which are positive because"' >

and

loa/ okl

are calculated as,

=
=

~

and

Pi,

> ~-

According to (2), "' (k) reflects the degree to which the marginal utility of quantity
for product M (L) is reduced. When consumers' marginal utility decreases dramatically,
the quality of product M imposes a relatively small impact on total demand. The
above proposition shows that the multinational firm should pay more attention to the
substitutability between product M and product L when making local-content decision .

•
In addition to our above sensitivity analysis, we also find that the multinational
firm's optimal local content rate a* is not affected by (i) the parameters r5 and

8-

which are regarded as the multinational and the local firms' absolute advantages in the
market, (ii) the local firm's unit acquisition cost C1 and unit assembly cost

CA,

and

(iii) the multinational firm's unit assembly cost CA. Such a result shows that when
making local-content decision, the multinational firm should focus two factors related
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to the local firm-the product substitutability index (i.e., f.L) and the degree to which
the marginal utility of quantity for product Lis reduced (i.e., R), and does not need to
pay much attention to other factors about the local firm.

5

The Two-Stage Analysis under Local Content Requirements

We recall from Section 1 that some governments (especially, those in developing countries) implement the Local Content Requirements (LCRs) to impose the penalty tariff
on the multinational firms that do not meet the LCRs. Let (3 denote the minimum
local content rate required in the local market and tp denote the additional (penalty)
tariff rate when the multinational firm does not meet the LOR (i.e., a < (3). The
multinational firm's unit cost A(a) under the LOR is calculated as,

A(a) =

M1(a) = M(a),
{ M2 (a) = M(a)

if a~ (3,

+ tpC(a)(1- a),

Note that M 2 (a) can be regarded as a M(a) with the "tariff rate (t
is also assumed to be a convex function of a, i.e.,

5.1

M~(a) ~

(19)

if a< (3.

+ tp),"

and M2 (a)

0.

Optimal Local Content Rate under the LCR

The LOR changes the multinational firm's unit acquisition cost, thereby influencing the
firm's local content rate decision. This requires that, in order to find the multinational
firm's optimal decision on the local content rate, we need to compare the multinational
firm's maximum profit when the firm meets the minimum local content rate and that
when the firm does not. Denoting by V1(a) and V2 (a) the multinational firm's adependent unit profits without and with the penalty tariff, respectively, we have,

Vi(a) =

4

/'i;K ~ f.L 2

[-

(2/'i;K- f.L 2 ) Mi(a)- (2/'i;K + /'i;f.L 2 - f.L 2 ) Og(a) + !'i;f.L ( CA + C1)

+2/'i;KO- l'l;f.LJ- f.L 2 0J , for i = 1, 2.
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(20)

Therefore, the multinational firm's profit can be written as,

V(a) =

vl (a),

if a 2: (3;

{ V2(a),

if a < (3.

The first- and second-order derivatives of

Vi'(a) = - 2r;,P;, -

f-l2 [

A

4 f'i,f'i,-J-l 2

Vi" (a) = -

~(a)

Mi'( a )

2r;,P;, - f-l2 [Mi"( a )
A

4 f'i,f'i,-J-l 2

(i = 1, 2) w.r.t. a are calculated as,

+ Sg '( a )] ,

(21)

+ Sg"( a )] < 0,

which follows from the facts that g"(a) > 0, Mf'(a) 2: 0, and Mf(a) 2: 0. That is,

~(a)

is a strictly concave function of a. Because the multinational firm absorbs the penalty
tariff if and only if his local content rate is less than (3' the domains for

vl (a)

and

v2 (a)

are [(3, 1] and [0, (3), respectively.
Similar to Proposition 2, we can find the optimal local content rate ai maximizing

V1(a) and the optimal rate a2 maximizing V2 (a) as follows:

(3,

ar =

Qb

1,

+ Mf ((3) > 0,
if Sg'((3) + Mf((3) $ 0 < Sg'(1) + Mf(1),
if Sg'(1) + Mf(1) $ 0;
if S g' ((3)

(22)

and
0,

a;=

if Sg'(O)

+ M~(O) 2: 0,

+ M~(O) < 0 < Sg'((3) + MHf3),
(3- e:, if Sg'((3) + M~((3) $ 0,
&2,

if Sg'(O)

(23)

where & 1 and & 2 represent the unique solution of V{(a) = 0 [or, Sg'(a) + Mf(a) = 0]
and that of V~(a) = 0 [or, Sg'(a) + MHa) = 0], respectively; and e: is an infinitesimally
small and positive number.
Comparing the multinational firm's maximum profit when the firm meets the minimum local content rate [i.e., V1 (ai)] and that when it does not [i.e., V2(a2)], we can
attain the multinational firm's optimal decision on the local content rate, as given in
the following proposition.
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Proposition 7 Under the LCR with the minimum local content rate (3, the multinational firm's optimal local content rate a*-which maximizes the firm's profit V(a)-is
uniquely obtained as,
1,

if !{(1) ~ 0;

a1, if J{(f3)
(3,

a*=

~

o < !{(1);

if J{(f3) > 0 and f~(f3) ~ 0,

(24)

or, if f~(O) < 0 < !Hf3), and !1(!3) ~ h(a2),
or, if f~(O) ~ 0, and !1(!3) ~ h(O);

a2, if f~(O) < 0 < !~([3), and !1([3) > h(a2);
0,

if f~(O) ~ 0, and !1(!3) > h(O);

=Sg(a)+Mi(a) [and thus, ff(a) = Sg'(a)+Mf(a)]; and, 0 < a

where fi(a)

if both a1 and

1

< a2 < 1

a2 belong to the range (0, 1).

Proof. If the multinational firm's optimal local content rate ai is equal to 1 or

a1 ,

then ai > f3 and the LCR has no impact on the multinational firm's decisions. Thus,

a*

=

ai, if ai

=

1 or ai

=

Ci1. When ai

= f3,

we cannot assure that f3 must be

the optimal local content rate when the LCR does not apply. Thus, although the firm
is responsible to the penalty tariff if his local content rate is

a;,

he can still attain a

higher profit by adopting a2. It thus follows that we should compare Vi ([3) and V2(a2)
to decide on the optimal local content rate for the multinational firm.
1. If ai

= f3

and a;

= f3- c,

then V2(a2)

= V2(f3- c).

penalty tariff if he adopts the local content rate

Since the firm absorbs the

a;, we find that Vi ([3) > V2 ([3- c),

which means that a* = f3.

2. If ai

= f3

and a;

= a2 ,

then a*

= f3

if V2(a 2) ~ V1([3), and a*

= a2

if V2(a 2) >

VI(f3).
3. If ai = f3 and a;= 0, then a*= f3 if V2(0) ~ V1([3), and a*= 0 if l-'2(0) > V1([3).
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We thus write a* as,
1,

if ai = 1;

al, ifai=<it;

/3,
a*=

if ai = /3 and a2 = /3 - c,
or, if ai = /3, a2 = a2 and V2(a2) :S Vt(/3),
or, if ai = /3, a2 = 0 and V2(0) :S Vt(/3);

a2, if ai = /3, a2 = a2 and V2(a2) > Vt(/3);
0,

if ai = /3, a2 = 0 and V2(0) > Vt ((3),

where ai is the unique solution of the equation that Sg'(ai)

+ M[(ai)

= 0, fori= 1, 2.

As Proposition 3 indicates, a2 > a 1 since V2(a) can be regarded as a Vi(a) with
the "tariff rate (t + tp)". When a2 = a2, we find that al < a2 < /3, and thus ai = (3.
Therefore, a2 = a2 is a sufficient condition for ai = /3. Similarly, when a2 = 0, we have

a1 < a2 < 0, and thus ai = /3. It then follows that a2 = 0 is also a sufficient condition
for ai = /3. Therefore, the expression of a* can be simplified as
1,

if ai = 1;

ab ifai=a1;
/3,
a*=

if ai = /3 and a2 = /3 - c,
or, if a2 = a2 and V2(a2) :S Vi(/3),
or, if a2 = 0 and V2(0) :S V1 (/3);

a2, if a2 = a2 and V2(a2) > V1(/3);
0,

if a2 = 0 and V2(0) > V1 (/3),

Furthermore, the region in which the optimal local content rate a* falls satisfies
the following criteria: (i) a* = 1, if V{(1)

~

0; (ii) a* = a1. if V{(/3) > 0 > V{(1); (iii)

a*= /3, ifV{(/3) :S 0 :S V2(/3), orifV{(/3) :S 0, V2(0) > 0 > V2(/3), and V2(a2) :S V1((3), or
if V{(/3) :S 0, V2(0) :S 0 and V2(0) :S Vi(/3); (iv) a*= a2, if V{(/3) :S 0, V2(0) > 0 > V2(/3)
and V2(a 2) > V1 (,8); and (v) a*= 0, if V{(,B) :S 0, V2(0):::; 0 and V2(0) > V1(f3).
Using equations (20) and (21), we can re-write a* as in (24). This proposition is
thus proved. •
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Noting that in equation (20) the sign of Sg'(a) + Mi(a) is negative, we find that the
value of V;(a) is decreasing in fi(a). That is, in the above proposition, [- fi(a)] reflects
the impact of local content rate a on the multinational firm's unit profit v;(a), since
the value of a influences both the cost and the quality of the product M. It also follows
that the first-order derivative [- fi(a)] reflects the marginal profit of local content rate.
Let

_ d[-Mi(a)]
dg(a) '

'Yi (a ) =

which can be regarded as the increase in the multinational firm's cost when the quality
level of product M is increased by one unit, for a given value of the local content rate a.
Then JI(a) > 0 is equivalent to 'Yi(a) < S, and means that the marginal cost of product
M's quality is smaller than S.
The above proposition indicates that, when calculating the optimal local content rate
a*, we should first look at the multinational firm's profit when the firm satisfies LCR.

A sufficient condition for the multinational firm to meet the LCR is that the marginal
cost of product M's quality when the firm adopts the LCR threshold (3 is sufficiently
large such that -y 1 ((3) ;?: S [ or, ff(f3)

~

0]. This indicates that if the cost for increasing

product's quality is very high, then the multinational firm should adopt a high local
content rate to keep the cost for product M in an acceptable level. When -y 1 ((3) < S,
the optimal local content rate is (3, &2 , or 0, which depends on the values of -y 2 (0) and
-y 2 ((3), and 0, and also the comparison among the impact of local content rate a on the

multinational firm's unit profit when the firm adopts local content rates (3, &2 and 0,
i.e., !1(!3), !2(&2), and !2(0).
Under the LCR, two firms' prices in Nash equilibrium, unit profits, and total profits,
and the resulting demands for two products can be obtained by simply replacing M(a)
in Section 3 with A( a). To illustrate the multinational firm's optimal local content rate,
two firms' pricing decisions, and the resulting demands for two products, and two firms'
profits, we provide the following numerical example.
Example 2 We re-consider Example 1 but assume that the policy maker in the local
market requires the LCR with (3

= 60% for the product of the multinational firm, and

the penalty tariff rate is tp = 30%. That is, the multinational firm absorbs an additional
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30% penalty tariff if the local content rate in his product is smaller than 60%.
We attain the multinational firm's optimal local content rate when he meets the
LCR (i.e., ai) and that when the firm does not (i.e., a;). Under the constraint that
a~

that

(3, we find that

ai = (3 = 0.60 because V{((3) = -76.075 < 0.

a>

0.452 E (0, 0.60). It thus follows that

(3,

we compare

ii2

=

ITf (0: 2 )

Ilf' ((3) = $4,383.444.

Under the constraint

a; = 0:2 = 0.452. Next,
IIf (0: 2 ) = $3, 761.128 and

IIf ((3), which are calculated as
Since IIf ((3) > ITf (0: 2 ), the multinational firm's optimal local

and

content rate a• is determined as a• = (3 = 0.60.
Then, we solve (9) and (10) to find two firms' prices in Nash equilibrium as pN =
$252.667 and fiN = $213.528.

The resulting demands are DN (a•) = 58.982 and

iJN(a•) = 46.451. The two firms achieve their profits as ITN(a•) = $4,383.444 and
fiN (a•) = $2, 718.662, which demonstrates that the multinational firm's profit is higher
than the local firm's.
When we compare the above results with those in Example 1 (in which the LCR
does not apply), we find the following insight regarding the impact of the LCR. First,
the LCR significantly raises the optimal local content rate of the multinational firm
from 0.370 to 0.60. Secondly, the implementation of the LCR reduces the multinational
firm's profit from $5, 375.271 to $4, 383.444 by 18.452%, whereas it increases the local
firm's profit from $2,162.636 to $2,718.662 by 25.711%. Thirdly, under the LCR, for the
multinational firm's product, the demand DN (a•) is reduced from 65.315 to 58.982 and
the price pN is decreased from $262.947 to $252.667; but, both the demand iJN(a*) and
the price fiN for the local firm's product are increased. Actually, the decrease in the price
pN partly results from the reduction in the quality of the multinational firm's product,
which happens as a consequence of increasing the local content rate. The above results
show that the LCR, as a "regionalism policy," transfers the demand and the profit from
the multinational firm to the local firm but may not benefit local consumers, which is
shown by our numerical result that, in the example, consumers' net utility is decreased
from 6, 110.425 to 5, 871.308, when the LCR applies.
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•

5.2

Impact of the Penalty Tariff Rate tp under the LCR

When the multinational firm's optimal local content rate is equal to or larger than

(3 if LCR is not implemented, i.e.,

Jf(/3)

~

0, the firm satisfies the LCR, thus, any

change in the value of tp does not influence the firm's profit and his local content rate
decision. Therefore, in the following proposition we investigate the impact of tp on a:*
when

fi ((3)

> 0.

Proposition 8 When the multinational firm's optimal local content rate is not smaller
than (3 if LCR is not applicable, i.e.,

fi ((3)

> 0, we obtain the following results regarding

the impact of the penalty tariff rate tP on the multinational firm's optimal local content
rate decision a:*.
1. When C'(O)

~

C(O), the multinational firm's optimal local content rate is uniquely

found as,

where tg and t1 are the respective unique solutions of the equations f~(O) = 0 and

h(O) =

!I(/3),

and can be expressed as,

to =
P

t1 =
P

Sg'(O) + C'(O) _ t
C(O) - C'(O)
'
Sg(/3) + C(/3) [1 + t(1- (3)] _ t _
1
C(O)
.

2. When C'(O) < C(O), the multinational firm's optimal local content rate is uniquely
found as,

(3,

if tp > lp,
0

-

-

or, if tP < tp < tp, and tp > tp,
a*=

(25)

or, if t1 < tp < tg;
•

0

-

-

1f tP < tP < tp, and tp < tp;
0,

if tp < min{t1, tg};

where lp and tp are the respective unique solutions of the equations f~(f3) = 0 and
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h(&.z) = /I(/3), and can be expressed as,

Sg'(/3) + C'(/3)
tp = C(/3)- (1- (3) C'(/3) - t,
S [g(/3)- g(&. 2 )] + C(/3) [1 + t(1- /3)]
1
[P =
C(&. 2 )(1- &.z)
- t - 1- &.z ·
Proof. As indicated by Proposition 7, when f{ ((3) > 0, the multinational firm's optimal
local content rate is uniquely found as,

(3,

if !~((3) :::; 0,
or, if fHO) < 0 < !~((3), and /I(/3):::; h(&.z),
or, if fHO) ~ 0, and /1(/3) :::; fz(O);

a* =

&.2, if f~(O) < 0 < JH/3), and /I(/3) > fz(&.2)i
0,

if f~(O) ~ 0, and /I(/3) > fz(O).

1. We firstly discuss the situation when C'(O) ~ C(O).

C'(O) + (t + tp) [C'(O)- C(O)], if C'(O)

~

Since

f~(O) =

Sg'(O) +

C(O), then fHO) > 0. Since V2(a) can

be regarded as a V1 (a) with the "tariff rate (t + tp)", the firm's profit is decreasing
in penalty tariff rate tp according to Corollary 3. In this case, the multinational
firm adopts the optimal local content rate of /3 if tP is large enough to assure
that Vz(O) :::; V1(/3), i.e., /I(/3) :::; fz(O). Otherwise, the firm uses only imported
components to make product M; that is, a*= 0, if V2 (0) > V1 ((3).
2. When C'(O) ~ C(O), we easily rewrite f~(O) < 0 as tp > t~ = [Sg'(O)+C'(O)]/[C(O)-

C'(O)] -

t, and f~(O) ~ 0 as tp:::; t~.

Using fi(a)

= Sg(a) + Mi(a), equation 19 and g(O) =

0, we can easily rewrite a* as

stated in equation 25. This proposition is thus proved. •
We learn from above proposition that if the penalty tariff rate tp is sufficiently high,
then it can induce the multinational firm to adopt the LOR threshold (3. While both the
increase of tariff rate t and that of penalty tariff rate tp can lead the firm to increase his
local content rate in most cases, t does not work when C'(O) ~ C(O). This distinguishes
penalty tariff rate tp from tariff rate t in the ability to change the multinational firm's
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local content rate since if tp is large enough that tp > t~, then the multinational firm
should satisfy the LCR, i.e., a•

= f3.

Remark 6 A penalty tariff policy is very useful in inducing a multinational firm to
enhance his local content rate. If the firm's local content rate is zero and C'(O) 2: C(O),
then the firm has only two choices concerning his local content rate: either zero or f3, the
choice of which depends on the comparison between V2 (0) and V1 (f3). If the firm's local
content rate is zero but C'(O) < C(O), or if the firm's optimal local content rate is not
zero, then the firm's optimal local content rate might be any value between [0, /3], and
he should enhance his local content rate when tp increases; but the firm should adopt
the LCR threshold f3 only when tp is sufficiently high to assure that V2 (& 2 )::; V1 (f3) or
&2 2:

/3,

i.e., when tp > tp or tp >

lP'

Using the above proposition, we attain the results regarding the impact of tp on the
demands for products M and L, and the multinational and the local firms' profits, as
shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 5 When product M is not fully made of local components (i.e., a• = &2
or a• = 0), then both the demand for product M and the multinational firm's profit
are decreasing in tp but both the demand for product L and the local firm's profit are
increasing in tp. Otherwise, neither the demand nor the profit for two firms change as
tP is increased.

Proof. If an increase in the penalty tariff rate tp does not induce the multinational firm
to meet the local content requirement, then the firm always pays the penalty tariff. We
can regard the sum of t and tp as the total tariff rate applicable to the firm. According
to Corollary 3, increasing the penalty tariff rate can result in an decrease in the demand
for product M and the multinational firm's profit.

If, after tp2 is increased, the multinational firm's local content rate is

/3,

then we

compare the firm's unit profit before and after the increase of tp-which are V2(a*) and
V1 (/3), respectively-to find the impact of tp. Prior to the increase of tp, the optimal
local content rate a* is not

/3;

this means that V2 (a*) > Vi(/3). However, subsequent to

the increase of tp, the optimal local content rate a* is turned into
45

/3;

this means that

V2 (a•) < V1 (,B) under the new penalty tariff policy. Since V1 (,B) keeps the same before
and after the change of tp, this indicates that the increase of tp causes the decrease in

V2(a•) from the value that is larger than V1 (,B) to the value that is smaller than V1 (,B).
That is, the multinational firm's profit decreases after the increase of tp. We thus prove
the impact of tp on the demand for product M and the multinational firm's profit.
Next, we show the impact of tp on the local firm. If an increase of the penalty tariff
rate tp makes the multinational firm to increase his local content rate but does not
induce the firm to adopt the LCR threshold ,B' then we can calculate afi N(&.)I 8tp to
examine the impact of tp on fiN(&.). Differentiating the local firm's unit profit function
in (13) once with respect to a, we have,

=

~1

4~~-

J.L 2

{kJ.L [C'(a) + tC'(a)- taC'(a)- tC(a)]

+ (.t. + 2~k- J.L2) J.LOg(a)}.
Using (16)' we find the first-order derivative afi N(&.)I 8tp at the point &. as,

Differentiate fiN(a) once w.r.t tp yields,

According to Proposition 8, &. is increasing with tp, i.e., 8&.1 8tP > 0. It thus follows
that ofiN(&.)I8tP > 0.

If, after tp2 is increased, the multinational firm's local content rate is still 0, then we
compare the local firm's unit profit fiN(O) for different values of tp. From Corollary 2
and (19), we learn that, when a = 0, increasing the value of tp raises M 2 (0) but increase

fiN(o).
The above analysis indicates that as tp increases, if a is increased within (0, 1), then
the local firm's unit profit fiN(&.) increases. Noting from Corollary 2 that, when a= ,B,

fiN (,B) when the penalty tariff is not applicable is lower than that when the penalty
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tariff is applicable. Therefore, if an increase in the penalty tariff rate tp makes the
multinational firm to adopt the LCR threshold (3, the local firm's demand and profit
increase. The corollary is thus proved. •
To illustrate the above analysis, we perform a sensitivity analysis to examine the
impact of the penalty tariff rate tp. All parameter values are specified as in Example 2,
see a summary given as follows:

400

300

1.5

1.5

0.7

0.6

5

5

Ct
150

t

t

0.15

/3
0.3

0.60

Table 4: Values of parameters in sensitivity analysis when the LCR is implemented
Similar to Section 4.2, we consider three scenarios including Scenario I [C'(a) > 0
for a E (0, 1)], Scenario D [C'(a) < 0 for a E (0, 1)], and Scenario C [C"(a)

~

0 for

a E (0, 1)], and for each scenario we increase the value of tp from 0 to 0.9 in increments
ofO.l. For each value oftp, we calculate a*, pN(a*), pN(a*), DN(a*), fJN(a*), TIN(a*),
and fiN(a*).

Figure 5: The impact of the penalty tariff rate tp on the optimal local content rate a*,
and the Nash equilibrium-characterized prices pN (a*) and pN (a*).

As Figure 5(a) indicates, the curve for aj depicts three possibilities for Case 3 in
Proposition 8. Specifically, if we increase tp from 0 to 0.1, then the optimal local content
rate for the multinational firm is 0; if we increase tp to 0.2, then the firm should increase
his local content rate to 0.055 which is smaller than the LCR threshold
we increase tp to 0.3, then the firm has to adopt the LCR threshold

/3 =

/3 =

0.6; and, if

0.6. The curve

of a(: depicts two possibilities for Case 2 in Proposition 8. That is, if tp is increased
from 0 to 0.1, then the firm increases his local content rate which is smaller than the
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LCR threshold /3; if tv is increased to 0.2, the firm adopts the LCR cutoff level f3 = 0.6.
We can learn from all three curves for aj, a(:, and aiJ that, after the firm adopts
the rate f3 = 0.6, i.e., a*

~

/3, the firm will not change his local content rate as tp

increases. Figure 5 (b) and 5( c) reflects that, as tp increases, two firms' prices first both
increase; but, when tP is sufficiently large such that the multinational firm adopts the
LCR threshold f3 (i.e., a* = /3), pN(/3) is always smaller than pN(a*)la•<i3 before the
firm adopts the rate (3, whereas pN ({3) is always higher than pN (a*) Ia• <!3 before the firm
adopts the rate f3.

Figure 6: The impact of tp on the demand for product M DN (a*) and the demand for
product L bN(a*).

We note from Figures 6 and 7 that, as tv is increased, the demand for product M
DN(a*) and the multinational firm's profit IIN(a*) change in a similar manner, and the

demand for product L bN(a*) and the local firm's profit fiN(a*) also change similarly.
This happens mainly because each firm's profit is proportional to the square of the
firm's own demand in terms of the Nash equilibrium-based prices and the optimal local
content rates, as shown by Corollaries 1 and 2. Before the value of tp is increased such
that the multinational firm adopts the LCR threshold f3, DN (a*) and II N(a•) for the
multinational firm are both decreasing in tp, whereas bN(a*) and fiN(a*) are both
increasing in tv.
We learn from Section 4.2 that the differences among the values of fiN(a*) in three
scenarios are negligible when LCR is not applied. Specifically, fi f (a•), fi~ (a*), and
fi~(a*) are equal to 2170.173, 2162.636, and 2175.966, respectively. However, Figure 7
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Figure 7: The impact of tp on the multinational firm's profit TIN (a*) and the local firm's
profit fiN (a•).

shows that when the government imposes LOR on the multinational firm, the value of

:fi: N (a*) differs greatly among three scenarios. Furthermore, at situations in which the
multinational firm satisfies LOR,

:fi: f (a*) > :fi:;j" (a*) > fi ~ (a•). The results imply that

when LOR is implemented, the multinational firm cannot totally absorb the impact of
C(a*) by choosing his local content rate "freely". Rather, the firm has to compare the

penalty tariff and the additional cost resulting from increasing his local content rate.
LCR transfers the most benefit from the multinational firm to the local firm when C(a)
is increasing in a, because in Scenario I for any kind of component, an imported one is
always cheaper than a local one.

5.3

The Impact of the LCR Threshold {3

We analyze the impact of the LOR threshold (3 on the multinational firm's optimal local
content rate decision a• and the demands for two products and two firms' profits.
Proposition 9 When increasing the LOR cutoff level (3 in the local market from 0, we
have the following results regarding the impact of (3 on the multinational firm's optimal
local content rate a*.
1. If fHO) ~ 0, then a* is determined as,

(3, when (3 ::;

a• = {

/3°,

0, when (3 > /3°,
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where ,8° is the unique solution satisfying V2 (0) = V1 (,8°) [or, h(O) = !I (,8°)]. That
is, a* is increasing in ,B when ,B
2. If f{(O) 2: 0 and

f~(O)

~

,8° and it is independent of ,B when ,B > ,8°.

< 0 < !~(1), then

a* is determined as,

when ,B ~ ~'
when ,B > ~'
where~ is the unique solution satisfying V2(&2) = V1(~) [or, h(&2) =!I(~)] and
&1

< &2 <

(3 when

~. That is, a'" is increasing in (3 when (3 ~ ~ but it is independent of

f3 > ~.

3. If f{(O) 2: 0 and !~(1) ~ 0, then a* = ,B for all (3 E [0, 1], which means that a* is
increasing in (3.
4. If f{(O) < 0 < f{(1) and !~(1) ~ 0, then a* is determined as,

That is, a* is independent of (3 when ,B < a 1 and a* is increasing in (3 when

5. If f{(O) < 0 < f{(1) and f~(O) < 0 < !~(1), then a* is determined as,
& 1, when (3

a*=

(3,

< &b

when &1 ~ (3 ~ ~'

&2, when (3 > ~.
That is, a* is independent of (3 when (3 < & 1 , a* is increasing in (3 when a 1
~, and a* is also independent of (3 when (3

~

(3

~

> ~.

6. If f{(1) ~ 0, then a* = 1 for any value of (3 E [0, 1]. That is, a* is always
independent of ,B.

Proof. According to (22), (23) and Proposition 7, we consider the following six possibilities.
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1. If !2(0) 2: 0, then 0: 2 ~ 0. According to Proposition 3, 0: 1 < 0: 2 ~ 0. Therefore,

= /3,

ai

a;

= 0,

and V{(a) < 0. When j3

is decreasing in a and ai =
j3

= 0,

we find that ai

/3, Vl(ai) 2: V2(0) for

j3 ~

= 0.

Since V1(a)

/3° and V1(ai) < V2(0) for

> /3°. Therefore, a* = ai = j3 for j3 > /3° and a* = a; = 0 for j3 < /3°.

2. If f{(O) 2: 0 and !2(0) < 0 < /2(1), then ai

= /3,

a; = min{ D:2, f3 -

V{(a) < 0. When j3 = 0, ai = 0. Thus, a*= j3 when j3

~

c }, and

0:2; and, the value of a*

depends on the value of ~(/3) and l/2(0: 2), when j3 > 0:2. For the case that j3 > &2,
we find that, because ~(a) is decreasing in a, V1(f3) 2: V2(ii2) if ii2 < j3 ~ {3, and
~(/3)

< l/2(& 2) if j3 > {3. It thus follows that a* = j3 when

when j3

= &2

> {3.

= j3

3. If fi(O) 2: 0 and !2(1) ~ 0, then ai

and a;= j3- c. Thus, a*

4. If fi(O) < 0 < ff(1) and !2(1) ~ 0, then ai

V{ (a) < 0 for a

[& 1, /3]. When j3

E

=

max{ii1,/3},

= /3.

a; = j3- c,

and

< ii 1, the LCR does not have any impact

on the multinational firm and thus, a*
a*=

j3 ~ {3 and a*

= &1.

When j3 2: a 1, ai

= j3,

and thus

/3.

5. If f{(O) < 0 < /{(1) and !2(0) < 0 < !2(1), then ai = max{ii1,/3} and a;=
min {&2, j3 - c}. When j3 < &1, the LCR does not impact the multinational firm
and thus a*

= &1.

When ii 1 ~ j3

~

&2, we find that ai

thus a* = j3. When j3 > &2, vl (!3) 2:

= j3

and a;= j3- c, and

v2 (&2) for &2 < j3 ~ {3, and vl (!3) < v2 (&2)

for j3 > {3. Hence, a*= ii 1 if j3 < &1; a*= j3 if ii 1 ~ j3 ~ {3; and a*= &2 if j3 > {3.
6. If f{(1)
ai

~

0, then &1 2: 1. According to Proposition 3, 0

= 1 and a; = j3 -

c. Since j3

~

1 = ai, a*

~

ii 1 < &2. Therefore,

= 1.

This proposition is thus proved. •
We learn from the above proposition that a multinational firm should satisfy the LCR
when threshold j3 belongs to a certain range, i.e., j3 E max{O, iii} ~ j3 ~ min{{3, 1} when
!2(0) < 0 and j3 E (0, /3°] when f2(0) 2: 0. Within the range, the increase of j3 leads the
firm to increase his local content rate. However, when j3 is largely increased such that
j3 > {3 [when f2(0)

< 0] or j3 > /3° [when !2(0) 2: 0], then the firm will adopt a lower

local content rate &2 or zero.
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We next conduct a numerical sensitivity analysis to illustrate the above analysis and
show how the multinational firm's and the local firm's Nash equilibrium-characterized
pricing decisions and the resulting demands and profits vary when the value of f3 changes.
Similar to our previous numerical studies, we consider Scenario I [C'(a) > 0 for a E
(0, 1)], Scenario D [C'(a) < 0 for a E (0, 1)], and Scenario C [C"(a) 2 0 for a E (0, 1)].
We increase the value of f3 from 0 to 0.9 in steps of 0.1; for each value of (3, we calculate
the multinational firm's optimal local content rate a*, and two firms' prices in Nash
equilibrium, the demands for two products, and two firms' profits.

Figure 8: The impact of f3 on the optimal local content rate
equilibrium-characterized prices pN(a"') and pN(a"').

a"', and the Nash

We learn from Figure 8(a) that the curves for both a'b and a(;. correspond to Case
5 in Proposition 9. For example, from the curve of a'b, we find that a"' is the constant
0.487 when (3 < 0.487; a"' is increasing in

/3

when ii 1 ~

/3

~

{3D = 0.660; and,

a* is the

constant 0.452 when f3 > {3 v· The curve for aj corresponds to Case 2 in Proposition 9;
that is, a* is increasing in
when

/3

when

/3

~

{3 I = 0.646, and is then the constant ii2 = 0.214

/3 > {3 I·

We can also note from Figures 8(b), 9(a), and 10(a) that, as the value of

/3

is

increased, the multinational firm's Nash equilibrium-based price pN (a"') decreases when

/3

~

{3; and the firm's price when /3 > {3 is much higher than that when /3 ~ {3. However,

DN(a"') and IIN(a"') are non-increasing in (3; specifically, both DN(a"') and IIN(a*) is
decreasing in

/3

when f3 ~ {3, and they are both reduced to lower values when f3 ::; {3.

As Figures 8( c), 9(b ), and lO(b) indicate, the curves for pN (a*), fJN (a*), and fiN (a*)
show a similar pattern. That is, when

/3

~

{3, they are increasing in /3; and when

f3 > {3, they are constant. The value of pN (a*) increases very significantly for Scenario
I, which happens mainly because C(a) increases dramatically in this scenario and, as
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(b)

(a)

Oll

nN

we discussed previously, pN (a•) is increasing in C (a).
Our above numerical results imply some insights for the policy maker in the local
market.
Remark 7 A proper increase in the value of (3, i.e., increasing (3 is within [max{O, O:I}, min{,B, 1}]
when f~(O) < 0 or within (3 E (0, (3°] when fHO) 2:: 0, can induce the multinational firm
to increase his local content rate, help the local firm achieve a higher price, demand,
and profit, and enables consumers to purchase product M at a lower price. However,
if the LOR is largely increased, then the multinational firm may disagree to raise his
local content rate as his profit would be reduced to a very low level. At the time, the
multinational firm chooses the local content rate 0:2 , which is even lower than (3, and
thus the price, demand, and profit for the local firm are all decreased to a low level
whereas the price for product M is increased to a high level. In addition, a very low
LOR threshold (3, i.e., (3 < & 1 , imposes no impact on the multinational firm, and the
firm should adopt the local content rate 0: 1 under such LOR threshold.

6

•

Summary and Concluding Remarks

In this thesis, we consider a duopoly market involving a multinational firm and a local
firm. The two firms produce two competitive products (i.e., products MandL are made
by the multinational and local firms, respectively), and the quality of the multinational
firm's product is affected by his local content rate. We first analyze the competition
between the multinational firm and the local firm when the LCR is not implemented
in the local country, and then investigate the impact of the LOR by investigate the
competition between the two firms under the LOR with a minimum local content rate
and a penalty tariff rate. Under such an LOR, the multinational firm absorbs a penalty
tariff if the local content rate for his product made in the local market is smaller than
the minimum required local content rate.
We develop and analyze a two-stage decision problem for the two firms, in which
the multinational firm first determines his local content rate and announces it to the
local firm, and two firms then decide on their prices for their products "simultaneously"
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(with no communication). Given the value of the local content rate o:, we solve the
"simultaneous-move" game and find two firms' a-dependent prices in Nash equilibrium
and the corresponding demands and profits of the two firms.

For a given value of

o:, when g(o:) is reduced, we find that the multinational firm achieves a higher price,
demand, and profit, whereas the price and demand for product L and the local firm's
profit all decrease. Here, a reduction in the value of g(o:) implies that (i) the quality of
the local components used by the multinational firm are improved by their producers,
and the multinational firm can thus produce high-quality products, or (ii) consumers'
confidence in the quality of product M is improved. We also find that, an increase in the
multinational firm's cost leads to an increase in the price for product M but a decrease
in the profit of the multinational firm.
Solving the two-stage problem, we find that, if the LCR does not apply, then the
multinational firm's optimal local content rate is a trade-off between the cost and the
quality of product M, depending on the product substitutability between products M
and L, the sensitivity of consumers' valuation to product M's quality, and the slope of
reduction in marginal utility of two firms' products.
Our analytical results show that the multinational firm should set a lower local content rate when the competition between products MandL intensifies, consumers' valuation is more strongly affected by product M's quality, and the reduction in consumers'
marginal utility is smaller. We also show that, when making local-content decision, the
firm needs to pay more attention to the substitutability of the two products than to the
slop of reduction in consumers' marginal utility, because the former impacts his optimal
local content rate more significantly. In addition, the demand for product M and the
multinational firm's profit decrease if consumers are more sensitive to the quality of
product M. Using our numerical analysis, we also find that when two firms' products
become more similar, the demand for product M may decrease or may first decrease and
then increase, but the demand for product L, the prices for product M and product L,
and both firms' profits certainly decrease.
Our analytical results also indicate that the tariff rate impacts the multinational
firm's local content rate by influencing the firm's cost. However, when the tariff-exclusive
cost increases too dramatically as the local content rate increases such that C'(O) > C(O),
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any change in the tariff rate cannot induce the multinational firm to replace some
imported components with the local ones. Otherwise, the firm needs to choose a positive
local content rate if the tariff rate is sufficiently high. Moreover, if the multinational firm
adopts a local content rate larger than 0, then the firm should raise his local content
rate as the tariff rate increases. Nevertheless, no matter how the multinational firm
adjusts his local content rate, the demand for product M and the firm's profit are both
decreasing in the tariff rate.
In Section 5, we analyze the impact of the LOR on the multinational firm's optimal
local content rate and two firms' prices in Nash equilibrium, and the resulting demands
and profits. We find that a sufficient condition for the multinational firm to satisfy
the LOR is that the marginal cost of product M's quality is sufficiently large when the
firm adopts the LCR threshold (3. Note that the LOR contains the minimum required
local content rate (3 and the penalty tariff rate tp. Our numerical experiment shows the
possible great impact of the LOR on the multinational firm. We derive the conditions
under which the multinational firm needs to increase his local content rate. In the
presence of the LOR, the multinational firm's optimal local content rate is not only the
trade-off between the quality and cost of product M but also a comparison between the
possible maximum profit when the firm meets the LOR and that when the firm does not.
The multinational firm should satisfy the LOR when the value of f3 belongs to a certain
range; and within the range, the multinational firm should increase his local content
rate, set a lower price, and obtain a smaller profit, while the local firm achieves a higher
price, demand, and profit. However, a very high threshold that is out of the range will
induce the multinational firm to adopt a low local content rate that is much lower than
(3 and set a higher price for product M, causing the local firm to decide on a lower price

for product L, and resulting in a low demand and profit for both the multinational firm
and the local firm. In addition, if the value of (3 is lower than the multinational firm's
optimal local content rate made when the LOR is not implemented, then the LOR has
no impact on the multinational firm.
Our sensitivity analysis for the penalty tariff rate tp shows that a penalty tariff
policy is very useful in inducing a multinational firm to enhance his local content rate:
(i) as long as the firm is still profitable, he should adopt the LOR threshold when tp is
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sufficiently high, and (ii) if the firm does not satisfy the LCR and does not fully use
imported components to make product M, then he should increase his local content rate

as the value of

tp

rises, resulting in a decrease in the demand for product M and the

multinational firm's profit but an increase in the demand for product L and the local
firm's profit.
In conclusion, we identify a number of factors that influence the multinational firm's
local content rate decision, and find that the LCR largely affect both the multinational
firm and the local firm. We derive the condition under which the multinational firm
should satisfy the LCR, and present a number of other managerial insights that are
expected to help practitioners to make a judicious decision on the local content rate.
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